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ABSTRACT
An increase in targeted violence incidents (TVIs), primarily active shooter events, at institutions
of higher education (IHEs) has exposed gaps in campus security plan preparation and exercises.
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to discover barriers to and best practices
of universities and colleges conducting security preparedness activities for TVIs. The theory that
guided this study was vested interest theory which predicts how attitudes will influence behavior
in a commitment to preparedness fundamentals. The setting for this study was two institutions of
higher education along the East Coast of the United States. Data collection techniques included
site documentation review, observation, and interviews of campus administrators, faculty,
emergency managers, and senior campus police officials. The three data types were triangulated
and summarized for each of the five research questions (a-e). I identified four themes from the
interview data: hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interests. The major
barriers to security preparedness were lack of resource funding for dedicated preparedness staff
and activities; apathy regarding campus security preparedness by administrators, staff faculty and
students; multiple federal security preparedness guides; and the lack of requirements for robust
security planning and exercises. Major recommendations identified from this study include
increased funding for campus security preparedness, IHE senior leadership must model the way
for campus security preparedness, IHEs acquire campus security accreditation, and the transfer
of IHE campus security preparedness oversight from the Department of Education (DOE) to
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Keywords: preparedness, plans, security, exercises, colleges, universities, targeted
violence incident (TVI), active shooter
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
An increase in targeted violence incidents (TVIs) in institutions of higher education
(IHEs) has highlighted the need for more focus on security planning and campus security
exercises. While campus security preparedness has improved greatly over the last 50 years, the
lack of federal or state requirements to engage in preparedness activities for TVIs has led to
inadequate security plans and exercises. There is a gap in the literature regarding best practices
to build vested interest in security preparedness. This qualitative collective case study helps to
bridge that gap and contribute recommendations to improve campus security preparedness. The
research audience includes legislative representatives, federal agencies, campus security
personnel, and higher education administrators with influence over college and university
practices. In this chapter I first provide a background of the topic, followed by a description of
how this topic applies to myself. Next are the problem and purpose statements, which are
followed by the significance that this study may have on the research literature and the world at
large. Finally, the research questions designed to address these problems are listed.
Background
As of 2015 there were 4,627 IHEs (public, private, 4-year, 2-year) that serve over 15
million students and several million faculty, staff, and visitors annually (International
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015; U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). Over the last 25 years, there has been a steady
rise in TVIs on college and university campuses in the U.S. (Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson,
& Weiss, 2010). These acts may originate from planned terror attacks, revenge-motivated
attacks, and/or random events, the number of which has increased in the United States and
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around the world (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b). In his February 11, 2003,
testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States, FBI Director Robert
Mueller, reported:
Our investigations suggest that al-Qaeda has developed a support infrastructure inside the
U.S. that would allow the network to mount another terrorist attack on U.S. soil.
Multiple small scale attacks against soft targets-such as banks, shopping malls,
supermarkets, apartment buildings, schools and universities, churches, and places of
recreation and entertainment-would be easier to execute. (U.S. Department of Justice,
2005, p. 62)
The type of assailants and weapons that result in a TVI may vary along with the severity
of the event (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b). The most commonly used
weapon is a gun, but knives, bombs, gases, and fire may be used as well. Types of assailants
may vary from terrorists, unstable mentally ill individuals, gangs, disgruntled IHE community
members, and individual criminals. Types of active violence incidents include armed assault,
armed attack, intrusion, deadly force incident, active shooter, targeted act of violence, and other
similar attacks (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).
Active shooter incidents constitute a large majority of the type of TVIs that have been
perpetrated at colleges and universities over the last 40 years. “An active shooter is an individual
actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated
area, most often using firearms and following no pattern or method in the selection of victims”
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p.2).
Following the attacks on Columbine in 1999, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S.
Department of Education teamed up to create the Safe School Initiative (Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy,
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Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004). According to this study, the term targeted violence stems from
the Secret Service’s Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP) to study individuals who have or
have attempted to harm a prominent public official in the U.S. since 1949. In the ECSP, the
Secret Service defined targeted violence as “any incident of violence where a known or
knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent act” (Vossekuil et al., 2004, p.
4). FEMA expands this definition to include the location as a target as well as a person(s).
FEMA does not include incidents that “just happened to occur” at that location (e.g., the result of
gang or drug activity; Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b).
Recent research has focused on looking beyond active shooter events to include hybrid
targeted violence (HTV). Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) is another type of attack
methodology in which there is an “intentional use of force to cause physical injury or death to a
specifically identified population using multifaceted conventional weapons and tactics”
(Frazzano & Snyder, 2014, p. 1). HTV incidents can involve multiple scenarios, including one
or more active shooters, and the use of fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and/or
chemicals as weapons (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and the U.S. Secret Service are the two primary federal agencies focused on HTV research
(Frazzano & Snyder, 2014).
For the purposes of this discussion and unless otherwise specified, I will use the term
targeted violence or targeted violence incident (TVI) to refer generally to acts of violence for
which IHEs must prepare. Whether it is an active shooter or a bombing, IHEs must strive to be
ready for anything.
Combining the data in Blair and Schweit (2014), Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, and
Weiss (2010), Lenn (2014), and McIntire and Wexler (2015), the following is a list of active
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shooter events at U.S. IHEs between the years 1966 and 2015 with two or more fatalities or
injuries: In August, 1966, 16 killed and 32 wounded at the University of Texas; July, 1976,
seven killed at California State University at Fullerton; November, 1991, five killed and one
wounded at the University of Iowa (IA); April, 1992, two killed at Indiana University (IN);
December, 1992, two killed and four wounded at Simon’s Rock College (MA); August, 1996,
three killed at San Diego State University (CA); September, 1996, one killed and 41 wounded at
Pennsylvania State University (PA); in 1998, one killed and three injured at South Texas
Community College (TX); January, 2002, three killed and three wounded at the Appalachian
School of Law (VA); October, 2002, three killed, at the University of Arizona Nursing College
(AZ); 2003, one killed and two injured at Case Western Reserve University (OH); 2006, two
killed at Shepherd University (WV); April, 2007, 32 killed and 17 wounded at Virginia Tech
(VA); February, 2008, two killed at Louisiana Technical College (LA); February, 2008, six
killed and 18 wounded at North Illinois University, (IL); 2008, two killed and one injured at
University of Central Arkansas; 2010, three killed and three injured at University of Alabama
(AL); 2012, one killed and seven injured at University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; April,
2012, seven killed and three injured at Oikos University in Oakland, CA (Lenn, 2014); and in
October, 2015, nine killed and nine injured at the Umpqua Community College (OR) (McIntire
& Wexler, 2015).
These incidents have raised awareness to prevent deaths from TVIs overall, with a focus
on active shooters on campus (Schafer, Heiple, Giblin, & Burruss, 2010). King (2014) reported
that following the active shooter incidents at Virginia Tech and North Illinois University, the
number of IHEs with armed sworn officers nationwide showed small increases. This flurry of
activity and interest immediately following campus violence quickly gives way to a sense of
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complacency leaving IHEs vulnerable to a myriad of potential threats (Goodman, 2009).
Research by Seo, Torabi, Sa, and Blair (2012) indicated that even though most colleges have
emergency plans in place, only 25% of campuses believed their students understood or were
prepared to respond to a TVI.
The general problem that I address is that we know little about how campuses respond to
violence and even less about how different constituents groups on campus respond to a
potentially violent incident. Knowing the information would help us devise better plans
for reacting to this type of problem as well as add to the literature on violence in
educational settings. (Creswell, 2013, pp. 270-271)
Even though many colleges and universities have a division of the institution focused on
emergency preparedness, many recommendations made from federal agencies to increase
preparedness have not been adopted (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2014). According to federal
agency data, only 52% of IHEs had drills for emergency response plans (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2013b). Additionally, the respondents indicated that most of those plans
were multipurpose and lacked significant depth for security incidents. The core document to
prepare and respond to a TVI is a security plan. Even though awareness has grown since the
TVIs at Virginia Tech and North Illinois University, the lack of overall crisis management plans
is a major problem that impacts institutional operations, technology, and infrastructure (Wang &
Hutchins, 2010).
While there are limited federal legislative requirements for emergency response and
evacuation procedures at IHEs, there are no specific legislative requirements for IHEs to have
campus security plans or conduct exercises for TVIs (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).
Overall federal guidance on exercises rests with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s
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Federal Emergency Management Agency, which administers the Homeland Security Exercise
and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). While campus preparedness resource investments have
increased over the last 20 years, only 31% of colleges and universities have increased funding for
campus safety since 2007 (Schafer et al., 2010). The Jeanne Clery Act requires the reporting of
annual criminal statistics at IHEs to the U.S. Department of Education, but lacks comprehensive
requirements for security plans and exercises at IHEs (Sokol, 2010). The only requirement under
the Clery Act that are mandated in the Code of Federal Regulations (34 CFR 668.46) is to
disclose emergency response and evacuation procedures. The U.S. Department of Education,
Office of Postsecondary Education (2011) interprets the Code of Federal Regulations (34 CFR
668.46) as follows:
This requirement is intended to ensure that an IHE has sufficiently prepared for an
emergency situation on campus, has tested those procedures to identify and improve on
weaknesses, and has considered how it will inform the campus community and other
individuals, such as parents and guardians. The Clery Act provides flexibility to IHEs in
designing their tests and does not prescribe a particular type that must be used. (p. 49-50)
A sample procedures statement is provided in the U.S. Department of Education, Office of
Postsecondary Education Handbook (2011), which links many other federal agency planning
guidelines, but does not include them in the minimum requirements:
The University’s Incident Manual includes information about Incident Teams, University
operating status parameters; incident priorities and performance expectations; shelter-in
place and evacuation guidelines; and local contingency and continuity planning
requirements. University Departments are responsible for developing contingency plans
and continuity of operations plans for their staff and areas of responsibility. The
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University conducts numerous emergency response exercises each year, such as table top
exercises, field exercises, and tests of the emergency notification systems on campus. (p.
104)
These numerous federal guidance documents for security preparedness are confusing and
lack accountability of institutional performance. As a result, IHEs have limited vested interest in
adopting federal agency recommendations.
Situation to Self
My primary motivation and worldview to conduct this study is the current vulnerability
of IHEs to effectively respond to TVIs on a college or university campus. My primary career
path in the U.S. Coast Guard has been in contingency planning for security incidents and natural
disasters. In 2007, I was selected for advanced education in the U.S. Coast Guard and received
Port Security Industry Training (PSIT). PSIT is a unique opportunity for U.S. Coast Guard
personnel to expand their knowledge of commercial port safety and security issues such as
facility safety compliance, containerized or explosive handling operations, maritime
transportation system recovery, and novel industrial processes. My PSIT was completed at the
North Carolina State Port Authority where I focused on gaining insight into senior management
problem solving relative to federal regulations and external influences. Additionally, I was
assigned for several weeks at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency field office in
Wilmington, North Carolina regarding government agency screening of foreign vessels to
increase professional knowledge to regulate the maritime industry.
I have served as the International Oil Spill Coordination Division Chief at the U.S. Coast
Guard Headquarters in the Office of Marine Environmental Response (MER) Policy where I
developed the exercise frameworks for the 2015-2016 Arctic Council’s Agreement on
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Cooperation in Pollution Preparedness and Response under U.S. Chairmanship. As the MER Oil
& Hazardous Substance Division Response Branch Chief from 2011-2013 following Deepwater
Horizon, I revitalized the MER Program’s Response Resource Inventory, establishing the
National Strike Force Center of Expertise, and completing a 10 year update of the guidelines for
the U.S. Coast Guard Oil Spill Removal Organization Classification Program. Other
assignments in the U.S. Coast Guard include Chief, Contingency Planning Division, Sector
North Carolina; Assistant Branch Chief, Marine Casualty and Analysis Branch, District Eight,
New Orleans; and Chief, Port Safety and Security Branch, Marine Safety Office, Mobile. I
graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1997 with a Bachelor of Science in Civil
Engineering.
Currently, in addition to my role as Director of the U.S. Coast Guard’s District 5 North
Region, I serve on the LANTAREA Incident Management and Assist Team (IMAT) as a
Planning Section Chief (PSC). The IMAT features alternating duty teams of approximately 25
members each, trained in specific incident command roles who are available to deploy on
approximately 12 hours’ notice. The IMAT is a command control resource which can provide
expert watch relief for extended command post operations and can further train and mentor
personnel on the Incident Command System (ICS).
The three major incidents I have responded to or created national policy for in my 19 year
career include 9/11 in 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
2010. Each of these disasters could have had improved response efforts with more focus on
contingency plans and exercises to increase preparedness beforehand.
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Finally, I am a father of two children who will attend college in the future. Given my
professional background and the apparent weaknesses among many campuses, I want my
children to be safe at the institution of their choice.
The philosophical assumption that led to my choice of research was epistemological
(Creswell, 2013). This assumption is focused on getting information from participants, such as
institution security planners, security exercise participants, and institution administrative leaders
who have a role in emergency preparedness. Axiological assumption may play a role with
potential bias from research subjects regarding the level of security preparedness at IHEs. The
expectation from the parents and the public in general is that the executive and legislative
branches of government will create sufficient federal legislation and regulatory requirements to
maintain the safety of students, faculty, and staff at IHEs. The federal government has the
responsibility of oversight of regulatory requirements in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR)
so that IHEs consistently meet the minimum federal requirements for student safety, whether the
IHE is public or private, small or large. However, bias should not impact the study to a large
extent. The methodological assumption should not be significant since a standardized system is
in place from multiple federal agencies for guidance on campus security plans and exercises.
Problem Statement
There is a lack of research regarding best practices for TVI security preparedness as well
as how IHEs incorporate the varied and confusing federal agency guidance (e.g., Department of
Education, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Secret Service).
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2005), “There is little qualitative research on the
response of college and university campuses to the threat of terrorist activity and no single entity
serves as a clearinghouse for research, policy development, and information exchange” (p. 23).
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Even if a security plan is in place, the literature suggests that most IHEs do not conduct exercises
regularly or update their plans from exercise lessons learned. Overall IHE compliance with
nationally published federal agency guidelines in emergency preparedness with regard to having
an institutional emergency plan has been reported at 96%, however, less than 10% of those
routinely exercise the plan (Cheung, Basiaga, & Olympia, 2014). A recent study indicated that
even though most colleges have emergency plans in place, only 25% of campuses believed their
students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis (Seo et al., 2012).
Without significant legislative changes by Congress to require implementation of security
planning recommendations and the HSEEP, motivating all IHEs to incorporate all federal
recommendations to improve preparedness is a Sisyphean task. How and why are some IHEs
independently vested to focus on preparedness? Barring new legislative requirements, how can
other IHEs with lesser standards and practices be compelled to improve their preparedness
actions?
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study is to discover barriers to IHEs’
implementation and maintenance of security preparedness for TVIs and to determine the most
successful tactics to incorporate preparedness throughout all IHEs. The theory guiding this study
is vested interest theory which predicts that self-interested attitudes will influence behavior
towards a commitment towards preparedness fundamentals (Miller, Adame, & Moore, 2013).
The more a behavior or attitude is perceived to benefit ones’ self, the more a person will regard
the behavior or attitude. Vested interest theory is a centerpiece of current IHE security
preparedness given the lack of federal or state requirements for security plans and exercises.
Campus security preparedness is based on how invested IHE leadership, campus administrators,

24
and other personnel are in exercise security plans and ensuring they are properly updated. Given
the overall rarity of incidents of TVIs on IHEs, and the direct and indirect costs of preparedness
as compared to other events and needs, some IHEs have a low vested interest in improving
security preparedness.
The setting of this research study was two IHEs on the East Coast of the U.S. Data
collection techniques included document analysis of institutional security plan documentation,
observation of exercises or preparedness activities, and conducting field interviews of faculty,
department chairs, and other campus representatives. Research questions were developed to gain
insight into the challenges and potential recommendations for increasing higher education
preparedness to respond to a TVI.
The primary theoretical framework used in this qualitative collective case study is vested
interest theory. This theory is described by Miller, Adame, and Moore (2013):
Essentially, vested theory concerns the hedonic relevance of a particular attitude-object in
its capacity to have meaningful personal consequences for an attitude holder. Hence, if
an attitude object is hedonically relevant, that attitude will be highly invested, and act as a
powerful predicator of outcome-relevant behavior. (p. 6)
The more that campus administrators, senior faculty, and other critical response
personnel become vested in overall preparedness, the more likely that security plans, robust
exercise schedules, and other risk reduction measures will be implemented. According to Snyder
and Holder (2015), “Many students and professional educators would be surprised to find that
investments and policies can be influenced by a desire to do ‘something’ rather than an ability to
do the ‘right thing’” (p. 57). Research has also shown that vested theory is an important factor in
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how individuals can motivate each other and improve attitudes and behaviors (Johnson, Siegel,
& Crano, 2014).
Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is that it could provide IHEs with a set of practical planning
and exercise recommendations for TVIs by improving compliance with the HSEEP
recommendations, the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, and Title IV requirements. The
research is clear that TVIs occur on IHE campuses with increasing frequency. When large scale
TVIs occur on campus, as in Virginia Tech and North Illinois University in 2007 and 2008,
appropriate and swift actions in accordance with the campus security plan by administrators,
campus security, faculty, staff, and students can save lives. The numerous individual
institutional task force and committee reports on security preparedness must be dusted off,
reviewed, and updated annually. The goal of this qualitative collective case study is to increase
preparedness, identify best practices, and ultimately to save lives during TVIs at IHEs.
Research Questions
Security preparedness guidance for IHEs from disparate federal agencies is extensive;
however, the limited research indicates that security guidance is not consistently implemented
across the country. As a result, the theme of the following research questions is to discover
which federal agency recommendations have been implemented and reasons why others have
not.
From this research, it may then be possible to develop recommendations to increase
overall campus preparedness (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). The following research
questions helped develop interview questions to get a story from research participants: (a) How
do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance of various types of
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exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) for the campus security plan?
(b) How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for overall preparedness to respond
to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student injuries and loss of life? (c) How
are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus security
plan? (d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators consistently
be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness? (e) Would new
legislation that centralized federal agency IHE security oversight, established across the board
requirements for campus security plans and exercises, and targeted resource support improve
campus preparedness?
Definitions
1. After Action Report (AAR) – “The AAR summarizes key exercise-related evaluation
information, including the exercise overview and analysis of objectives and core
capabilities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-1).
2. Active Shooter – An active shooter is “an individual actively engaged in killing or
attempting to kill people in a confined space or other populated area, most often using
firearms and following no pattern or method in the selection of victims” (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p. 2).
3. Best Practices – “Best practices are peer-validated techniques, procedures, and solutions
that prove successful and are solidly grounded in actual experience in operations,
training, and exercises” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-1).
4. Drill – “A drill is a coordinated, supervised activity usually employed to validate a
specific operation or function in a single agency or organization. Drills are commonly
used to provide training on new equipment, develop or validate new policies or
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procedures, or practice and maintain current skills” (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013c, glossary-3).
5. Exercise – “An exercise is an instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve
performance in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities in a
risk-free environment. Exercises can be used for testing and validating policies, plans,
procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements; clarifying and training
personnel in roles and responsibilities; improving interagency coordination and
communications; improving individual performance; identifying gaps in resources; and
identifying opportunities for improvement” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2013c, glossary-3).
6. Exercise Planning Team – “The exercise planning team is responsible for the successful
execution of all aspects of an individual exercise. The planning team determines exercise
objectives and core capabilities, creates a realistic scenario to achieve the exercise
objectives, and develops documents to guide exercise conduct and evaluation. The
planning team’s organization and management principles should include clearly defined
roles and responsibilities and a manageable span of control” (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-4).
7. Exercise Program Management – “Exercise program management is the process of
overseeing a variety of individual exercises and supporting activities sustained over time.
An effective exercise program helps whole community stakeholders maximize efficiency,
resources, time, and funding by ensuring that individual exercises are part of a
coordinated, integrated approach to building, sustaining, and delivering core capabilities”
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-4).
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8. Full Scale Exercise (FSE) – “FSEs are typically the most complex and resource-intensive
type of exercise. They involve multiple agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions and
validate many facets of preparedness. FSEs often include many players operating under
cooperative systems such as the Incident Command System or Unified Command” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-5).
9. Functional Exercise (FE) – “Functional exercises are designed to validate and evaluate
capabilities, multiple functions and/or sub-functions, or interdependent groups of
functions. FEs are typically focused on exercising plans, policies, procedures, and staff
members involved in management, direction, command, and control functions. In FEs,
events are projected through an exercise scenario with event updates that drive activity at
the management level. An FE is conducted in a realistic, real-time environment;
however, movement of personnel and equipment is usually simulated” (U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-5).
10. Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council (HSAAC) – was established to provide
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with advice and recommendations “on
matters related to homeland security and the academic community, including: academic
research and faculty exchange; homeland security academic programs; campus resilience;
international students; student and recent graduate recruitment; and cybersecurity” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 6)
11. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) – “HSEEP is a program
that provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common
approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct,
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evaluation, and improvement planning” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c,
glossary-5).
12. Hybrid Targeted Violence (HTV) – “intentional use of force to cause physical injury or
death to a specifically identified population using multifaceted conventional weapons and
tactics” (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014, p. 1)
13. Incident Command System (ICS) Protocol – “A system adopted by the federal
government for all hazards planning to identifying response roles of government and
private emergency responders” (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, p. 9).
14. National Incident Management System (NIMS) – “The NIMS standard was designed to
enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a
single, comprehensive system for incident management. It is a system mandated by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) that provides a consistent,
nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; the
private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of
cause, size, or complexity” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-7).
15. Non-Sworn Officer – “A campus law enforcement or security department employee who
acts as a first responder and whose principal responsibility is campus security and public
safety” (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015, p.
81)
16. Seminar – “Seminars generally orient participants to, or provide an overview of,
authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, protocols, resources, concepts, and
ideas. As a discussion-based exercise, seminars can be valuable for entities that are
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developing or making major changes to existing plans or procedures. Seminars can be
similarly helpful when attempting to gain awareness of, or assess, the capabilities of
interagency or inter-jurisdictional operations” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2013c, glossary-10).
17. Sworn Campus Officer – “An agency employee conferred with general police powers in
furtherance of his/her employment with the agency, including the ability to make a fullcustody arrest” (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators,
2015, p. 83)
18. Table Top Exercise (TTX) – “A TTX is typically held in an informal setting intended to
generate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simulated emergency.
TTXs can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse
concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection
from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident. Generally, TTXs
are aimed at facilitating conceptual understanding, identifying strengths and areas for
improvement, and/or achieving changes in attitudes” (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013c, glossary-11).
19. Targeted violence- “Targeted violence refers to any incident of violence where the
location was deliberately selected and not simply a random site of opportunity and where
the perpetrator selected a target before the incident. For example, incidents where the
attack ‘just happened to occur’ at that location, such as consequences of gang or drug
activity, would not be included” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013b, p. 2).
20. Training and Exercise Plan (TEP) – “The TEP is the foundation document guiding a
successful exercise program. The TEP articulates overall exercise program priorities and
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outlines a schedule of training and exercise activities designed to meet those priorities”
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c, glossary-11).
21. Training and Exercise Planning Workshop (TEPW) – “A TEPW is usually conducted to
create a Multi-year TEP. At a TEPW, stakeholders work together in a collaborative
workshop environment to identify and set exercise program priorities based on core
capabilities. Based on these program priorities, TEPW stakeholders develop a multiyear
schedule of specific training and exercises” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2013c, glossary-11).
Summary
This qualitative collective case study was necessary to fill a gap in the literature and to
reduce the risks of future incidents of TVIs at IHEs. The collective case study approach was
chosen due to the analysis of a real life situation of unusual interest. The key element that was
explored was what can be done to improve IHEs’ consistent vested interest in implementing
federal agency guidance on security preparedness given that there are virtually no legal mandates
to do so. My professional experiences in the U.S. Coast Guard have shown me the results of
gaps in response plans and effective exercise programs as in 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and
Deepwater Horizon. I have also experienced the immense benefits of effective planning and
exercise programs that supported actual incident solid decision making, effective
communications, and responsible use of resources. I used my expertise in security contingency
planning and exercises to conduct this research study and to develop recommendations to
improve safety and security for all IHEs.

32
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
An increase in TVIs at IHEs has highlighted the lack of preparation to prevent and
respond to such acts of violence on college campuses. Furthermore, the research literature
regarding the readiness of IHEs to effectively respond to TVIs is significantly lacking. IHE
plans and exercises follow federal government planning and exercise guidance, however, they
need more focus and actual implementation. This chapter contains the theoretical framework
which guides this study. This is followed by an extensive review of the literature including the
history, demographics, legislation, federal and state guidance for security preparedness, security
planning and exercises, IHE security accreditation, and challenges and supplements to security
preparedness.
Theoretical Framework
The primary theoretical framework used in this qualitative collective case study is
vested interest theory. Miller et al. (2013) stated, “Vested theory concerns the hedonic
relevance of a particular attitude-object in its capacity to have meaningful personal
consequences for an attitude holder” (p. 6). The more invested campus administrators, faculty,
and other critical response personnel become in overall preparedness, the more likely that
robust security plans and exercises will be implemented regularly.
Related Literature
History of Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs
Significant active shooter events have occurred on college campuses with multiple deaths
and injuries to students, faculty, and staff. Table 1 compiles data for the active shooter events at
IHEs since 1966 in which the number of fatalities or injured was two or greater. Figure 1
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illustrates the gradual increase in numbers of fatalities and injured, particularly in the last 10
years. Blair and Schweit (2014) noted that the locations with the higher casualty counts tend to
be educational facilities (e.g., Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary, Northern Illinois
University). Note, Umpqua Community College had only one unarmed security guard (i.e., a
non-sworn officer) or the entire campus (McIntire & Wexler, 2015).

Table 1
Active Shooter Events at IHEs from 1966 to 2015
Year

Location

Fatalities

Injured

1966
1976
1991
1992
1992
1996
1996
1998
2002
2002
2003
2006
2007
2008
2008
2008
2010
2012
2012
2013
2015

University of Texas (TX)
Cal State at Fullerton (CA)
University of Iowa (IA)
Indiana University (IN)
Simon’s Rock College (MA)
San Diego State University (CA)
Penn State (PA)
South Texas Community College (TX)
Appalachian School of Law (VA)
University of Arizona School of Nursing (AZ)
Case Western Reserve University (OH)
Shepherd University (WV)
Virginia Tech (VA)
Louisiana Technical College (LA)
Northern Illinois University (IL)
University of Central Arkansas (AR)
University of Alabama (AL)
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (PA)
Oikos University (CA)
Santa Monica College (CA)
Umpqua Community College (OR)

16
7
5
2
2
3
1
1
3
3
1
2
32
2
6
2
3
1
7
5
9

32
0
1
0
4
0
41
3
3
0
2
0
17
0
18
1
3
7
3
4
9

Note. Includes only shootings on campus with two or more killed or injured (Blair & Schweit,
2014; Frosch, Kumar, & Lazo, 2015; Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, Weiss, 2010; McIntire
& Wexler, 2015).
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Figure 1. Active Shooter Events at IHEs from 1966 to 2015.

HTV attacks are less common in U.S. schools than strict active shooter events, but still
occur. The Bath Township Michigan School Massacre in 1927 involved firearms, bombs, and
fire as weapons, as did the attack at the Olean New York High School in 1974. Frazzano and
Snyder (2014) refer to the two most horrific events at primary and secondary schools in the U.S.
as examples of HTV attacks. In 1999, two students from Columbine High School used guns,
IEDs, and fire to kill 12 students and one teacher and injure 23 (Kohn, 2001). In 2012, the 20
year old son of a kindergarten teacher at Sandy Hook Elementary School first killed his mother
in their home, then went to the school using ambush and breaching tactics to kill 20 children and
six adults with an assault rifle and two pistols (Vogel, Horwitz, & Fahrenthold, 2012). In 2006, a
former graduate student at the University of North Carolina Wilmington ran his SUV into a
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lunchtime crowd injuring nine people (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008). Federal law
enforcement officials indicated the student was motivated to conduct the act of violence as
retribution for the treatment of Muslims (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).
Active shooter events or HTV attacks at schools are not just an American problem, it is a
worldwide problem. One of the most violent attacks took place in Beslan, Russia on September
3, 2004. This small community of 40,000 was the location where 49 terrorists entered a school
at roughly 9:00 am local time and took 1,181 hostages (Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013).
Minimal to no contingency plans were in place for this type of hostage situation. In the end, 330
hostages were killed and 770 injured (Blair et al., 2013). This horrible incident remains one of
the deadliest attacks at a K-12 school in the world.
The events of September 11, 2001 changed Americans’ perspectives regarding their
vulnerability to targeted violence from terrorism or criminal activity. It seems that the threats
from within, by students on our own campuses, are ones we are still struggling to manage. Since
the 2007 Virginia Tech and 2008 North Illinois University shootings, numerous changes and
investments in campus security have occurred (Violino, 2010). These incidents have raised
awareness and motivated a call to action to prevent student deaths from shootings on campus
(Schafer et al., 2010); however, historically a sense of complacency has returned, leaving a
campus population vulnerable to a myriad of potential security violations, internal and external
(Goodman, 2009). According to Snyder and Holder (2015),
Accurate predictions of when and where the next shooter event will occur are virtually
impossible. However, predictions can be made with absolute certainty that active shooter
and hybrid targeted violence events will continue to occur in schools, workplaces,
shopping centers, and other public gathering places due to their ‘soft target’ status. (p. 58)
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While these latest campus shooting incidents changed the landscape of safety and security in
higher education, the question remains, is it enough? Are IHEs prepared to prevent and respond
to the next incident? With sufficient planning and preparation, students, faculty, and staff should
feel safe without being alarmed on a daily basis.
Demographics of Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs
The demographics of IHEs are very different based on size of the student population,
location to local emergency management resources, education programs, geographic location,
and layout of individual campuses (including satellite campuses). IHEs represent a broad range
of student activities beyond the traditional academic buildings, including student housing,
recreational buildings, student athletic complexes, and many more entities specific to each
institution (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). According to the U.S. Department of
Education (2010), “These structural and environmental characteristics pose challenges for access
control, monitoring movements, defining boundaries for facilities and grounds, standardizing
procedures, decision making processes, and prioritizing resource allocation” (p.1). IHEs are
among a compelling list of soft targets for potential targeted violence by an active shooter,
bombing, or other HTV modality (Snyder & Holder, 2015). Despite this, one estimate by United
Educators Insurance indicates that less than 30% of IHEs had a threat assessment prior to the
Virginia Tech shootings in 2007 (Hoover, 2008).
Security risks on campuses continue to rise. The figure below from Drysdale,
Modzeleski, and Simons (2010) illustrates that while the IHE student population far exceeded the
number of violent incidents on campus from the 1960s to 1980s, the number of incidents has
since equaled or exceeded the number of students. Hughes and White (2008) reported that over
71,621 acts of criminal behavior, including 15 murders, occurred on college and university
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campuses in 2004. While Sattler, Larpenteur, and Shipley (2011) reported that 104 murders
occurred between 2005 and 2007 on public and/or private 4-year campuses.

Figure 2. Increased Violence at Universities and Colleges. Adapted from “Campus attacks:
TVIs affecting institutions of higher education,” by D. A. Drysdale, W. Modzeleski, and A. B.
Simons, 2010, U. S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Safe and
Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction with Texas State University,
compiled data on active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014).
Note, that for the purposes of their study, Blair and Schweit (2014) did not include shootings
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related to gang or drug violence or other shootings in which the public was not in danger. Figure
2 depicts the number of active shooter incidents, without regard to location, between 2000 and
2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Figure 3 below depicts percentages of active shooter events in
different location types between 2000 and 2013 (Blair & Schweit, 2014). Motivations for active
shooter incidents are extremely varied ranging from personal problems, such as disputes with
employers or spouses/significant others, to varied levels of mental illness, perceived injustices,
or a deadly mixture of any or all of these issues (Blair et al., 2013). Commercial areas are by far
the most common sites for active shooter incidents, with 46%, but education settings are the
second most common at 24% (Blair & Schweit, 2014).

.
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Figure 3. Characteristics of active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013. Adapted from “A
study of active shooter incidents, 2000 – 2013,” by J. P. Blair and K. W. Schweit, 2014,
Copyright 2014 by Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S.
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.
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Figure 4. Location categories of active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013. Adapted from
“A study of active shooter incidents, 2000 – 2013,” by J. P. Blair and K. W. Schweit, 2014,
Copyright 2014 by Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S.
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.
In the New York Police Department’s analysis of active shooter incidents, Kelly (2012)
further limits the DHS definition of active shooter to “include only those cases that spill beyond
any intended victim to others” (p. 1). Less than 2% of active shooter incidents were carried out
by more than one person, less than 3% were carried out by women, and 36% involved more than
one weapon (Kelly, 2012). The United States has the highest level of active shooter incidents
with 271 between 1966 and 2012. Internationally, the next highest number of active shooter
incidents during the same time period was in Canada with eight, while only five other countries
witnessed no more than two incidents each (Kelly, 2012).
Despite the long list of horrifying incidents listed above, research into targeted violence is
limited due to their low frequency of occurrence at IHEs in this country. The demographic data
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of actual incidents is important to recognize. While this is a small percentage of the population,
the number of people killed or wounded could have been prevented or lessened with better
security preparedness. Another report completed by the Secret Service, U.S. Department of
Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (Drysdale et al., 2010) provided additional
insights into TVIs at IHEs from 1990-2008:
Incidents were identified in 42 states and the District of Columbia, with 57 % (n=155) of
the incidents affecting IHEs located in only ten states, eight of which are among the 10
states with the most IHEs. The majority of incidents affected IHEs designated as 4-year
institutions (84 %, n=228), followed by 2-year institutions (14 %, n=38), postsecondary
vocational/technical schools (1 %, n=4), and those identified as post-graduate only (1 %,
n=2). In all, incidents affected 218 distinct campuses. (p. 11)
The report described lethality of the assault was based on the use of deadly force with a weapon.
These statistics demonstrate that the states with the highest numbers of students in four-year
IHEs have the highest percentages for violence. Overall active shooter incidents from 20002010 data have seen a steady increase from one in 2000 to 21 in 2010 (Blair et al., 2013). A total
of 29 events occurred at schools over the 10 year period and 14 at a public venue (Blair et al.,
2013). This research clearly shows the increased vulnerability of schools for targeted violence.
The statistics are staggering in the aggregate and the need for more emphasis on campus security
at colleges and universities is evident in order to prevent, respond, and mitigate the damage of
these events.
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Transformation of Security Preparedness in Middle and High Schools
Public education in K-12 grade levels for security preparedness has increased over the
last 40 years, while the overall higher education system has not made significant increases to
security preparedness. For example, in the 1970s the number of full time police officers in
schools was less than 100, but now has increased to over 17,000 (Madfis, 2014). One study
showed that over 60% of teachers at suburban middle and high schools reported having armed
police officers in the schools (Madfis, 2014). Another major change in public education has
been the significant increase in security cameras in middle and high schools (Madfis, 2014).
Less than 20% of high schools had security cameras prior to 1990 while over 55% reported
having cameras in 2005 (Madfis, 2014).
A significant investment in police officers and security cameras occurred at public high
schools. Additionally, many school buildings have been adapted with electronic locks and
consolidated entry and exits. According to Madfis (2014), “Typically affluent communities
prefer these environmental designs (as well as surveillance through police and cameras) to the
daily use of metal detectors and random weapons searches” (p. 13). Schools with high violence
conditions have more invasive security preparedness and hands-on checking of students for guns,
knives, and other weapons. Public middle and high schools have responded to the threat of TVI
incidents through a variety of preparedness activities incorporating drills for active shooters,
increased numbers of police officers on campus, and cameras.
Legislation Regarding Targeted Violence Incidents at IHEs
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) included a framework of ensuring that IHEs
meet federal guidelines in order to receive federal funding (U.S. Department of Education,

43
Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011). The HEA Act of 1965 had limited language on
establishing requirements for student safety.
During the Vietnam War Era in the late 1960s and 1970s, protests on college campuses
occurred frequently. In May of 1970, a National Guard contingent was dispatched to assist in
keeping order at Kent State University (Adamek & Lewis, 1973). The National Guard
confrontation with Kent State University protestors resulted in the death of four students and
injuries to 10 others (Adamek & Lewis, 1973). Interpretation of the law by state governments
provided a relief to IHEs in protecting students prior to the 1980s. Colleges and universities
were primarily responsible for the security of property on campus (Lake, 2007). However in
1983, significant changes occurred with the court decision in Mullins v. Pine Manor College:
Mullins v. Pine Manor College established for the first time that campuses also have
duties to use reasonable care to protect not only property but also students and other
people from foreseeable danger. The court ruled against Pine Manor, finding that the
college owed the student a legal duty to use reasonable care to prevent foreseeable
dangers on campus. (Lake, 2007, p. 3)
This decision increased requirements for controlling overall security and crime on higher
institutions’ properties. Mullins v. Pine Manor College had impacts across colleges and
universities and started to end the isolated position of many administrators regarding the scope of
higher education student security responsibilities (Lake, 2007). General business-liability law
application to higher education campuses was a fundamental change to how security of students
would have to be addressed by college and university administrators.
Congress amended the HEA of 1965, entitled the Crime Awareness and Campus Security
Act of 1990 (Title II of Public Law 101-542), also known as the Clery Act (U.S. Department of

44
Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011). The Clery Act was named after Jeanne
Clery, a student at Lehigh University, who was raped and killed in her dorm in 1986. This Act
requires that faculty, students, and other higher education institution employees be notified when
an immediate threat to public safety is detected. This legislation linked safety and security
requirements for IHEs to student financial assistance at Title IV schools. Title IV institutions are
any colleges or universities, private or public, that have signed Program Participation
Agreements (PPAs) with the U.S. Department of Education that administer financial assistance
on behalf of the agency (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education,
2011). Types of financial assistance included under this Title IV provision are Pell Grants,
Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (FSEOGs), Federal Work-Study
Programs, Federal Perkins Loans, Direct Loan Programs, and the Leveraging Educational
Assistance Partnership (LEAP) Programs. All requirements of the Clery Act must be met in
order for the Secretary of Education to approve an institution’s PPA, and therefore to receive
funding (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011). Failure to
comply with the Clery Act can lead to the reduction or removal of student financial aid funding
and civil penalties (Lenn, 2014). This provision of the Clery Act provides very generic
requirements with regards to security preparedness, but with significant ramifications for noncompliance.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, which had been amended to the Crime Awareness
and Campus Security Act of 1990 (Title II of Public Law 101-542) or the Clery Act, was
reauthorized and expanded by Congress in 2008 and renamed to the Higher Education
Opportunity Act (HEOA) of 2008. The HEOA increased campus security requirements, as noted
by Kennedy (2011) to, “immediately notify the campus community upon the confirmation of a

45
significant emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health or
safety of students or staff occurring on the campus” (p. 22). The HEOA of 2008, as promulgated
in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 34 CFR 668.46 (Cornell Law Library, 2015), requires
IHEs to submit an annual security report which must include the following:
1. Annual crime statistics,
2. policies for timely reporting of crimes or emergencies,
3. policies regarding security of and access to campus facilities,
4. policies regarding campus law enforcement,
5. list of programs designed to enhance students’ and employees’ knowledge of campus
security procedures,
6. list of programs to inform the campus community about the prevention of crimes,
7. policies regarding criminal activity involving students at off campus facilities,
8. policies regarding alcohol and illegal drugs,
9. description of any substance abuse education programs,
10. policy statement regarding sexual assault programs and procedures to follow after a sex
offense occurs,
11. statement regarding location of law enforcement information,
12. policy statement regarding emergency response and evacuation procedures, and
13. policy statement regarding missing student notification procedures.
The requirement most relevant to this study is the policy statement regarding the
emergency response and evacuation procedures. Under this requirement, the institution must
document the following:
1. List the procedures used to confirm a threat;

46
2. list the procedures of notification
a. List the person(s) or organization(s) responsible for carrying out the notification
b. Determine what part of the campus community to notify
c. List the procedures regarding the notification of entities outside the campus
community;
3. list the procedures to test the emergency response and evacuation procedures;
4. perform a test of the emergency response and evacuation procedures at least once per
calendar year; and
5. for each test, document description of the exercise, the date, time, and whether it was
announced or unannounced.
While these requirements are minimal at best, the Department of Education has the power
to levy fines if not met. IHEs who fail to implement these minimum requirements to test
emergency response and notification procedures are subject to civil penalties from the
Department of Education of $27,500 per violation of the HEOA of 2008. One of the largest such
fines ever levied against an institution was $357,000 for violations of the HEOA of 2008
surrounding the death of a student at Midwestern University (National Association of College
and University Business Officers, 2008). Numerous violations were noted by the Department of
Education including failing to maintain a campus crime log, failure to include adequate policy
statements in the annual security report, and failure to disclose campus crime statistics (National
Association of College and University Business Officers, 2008).
Federal Guidance for IHE Security Preparedness
Under the HEOA of 2008 and with specific requirements in the Code of Federal
Regulations 34 CFR 668.46, the U.S. Department of Education is the primary federal agency
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with guidance regarding security preparedness at IHEs (Cornell Law Library, 2015). Higher
education campuses have not experienced the massive transformation of security preparedness
regulations post 9/11 as seen in airports, ports, and other modes of travel as required by the
federal government. For example, the government took over control of airport security from the
private sector at the majority of U.S. airports, yet there are only limited federal regulations
enforcing safety and security preparedness on IHEs.
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, FEMA developed a guide for IHEs to
bolster their disaster plans (for both natural and man-made), with an emphasis on safety and
security (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003). FEMA developed these guidelines to
develop “disaster-resistant” universities based on the experiences of six universities that
collaborated, with the assistance of federal grants, to become more “disaster-resistant.” The
participating institutions include Tulane University in New Orleans, University of Alaska
Fairbanks, University of California Berkeley, University of Miami, University of North Carolina
at Wilmington, and the University of Washington in Seattle (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 2003). According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003):
This document is both a how-to guide and distillation of the experiences of six
universities and colleges across the country that have been working over the past several
years to become more disaster-resistant. It complements the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) State and Local Mitigation Planning how-to guides that
provide planning guidance for creating and implementing a hazard mitigation planning
process . . . This guide provides basic information designed for institutions just getting
started as well as concrete ideas, suggestions, and practical experiences for institutions
that have already begun to take steps to becoming more disaster-resistant. (p. III)
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The guide is an additional supplement to millions of dollars awarded to IHEs from 1993-2003
for disaster response (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003). The guide focuses on
four phases of becoming a “disaster-resistant” university: (a) organizing resources, (b) hazard
identification and risk assessment, (c) developing the mitigation plan, and (d) adoption and
implementation (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003). This guide is a foundational
element for IHE security preparedness and referenced numerous times in the literature.
The U.S. Department of Education sets guidelines for emergency planning for IHEs
(U.S. Department of Education, 2007), and in 2010 published the “Action Guide for Emergency
Management in Higher Education,” which has three primary purposes: (a) to provide an
overview of emergency management, (b) to provide a resource for developing emergency
management plans, and (c) to provide an evaluation tool for campus emergency management
programs (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). Additionally, this “Action Guide . . .”
recommended IHEs utilize two other cornerstone documents for emergency preparedness (U.S.
Department of Education, 2010): (a) “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for
Schools and Communities,” published by the U.S. Department of Education (2007), and (b)
“Building a Disaster-Resistant University,” published by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA; 2003). According to the U.S. Department of Education (2010), “This action
guide is not meant to prescribe exactly how emergency management should be practiced; rather,
each higher education institution should decide for itself the best way to prepare to meet its own
unique set of needs” (p. 3).
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013c) published the Homeland
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that “provides a set of guiding principles for
exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and
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development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning” (p. 1). HSEEP guidelines were
established to improve national preparedness for federal, state, and local emergency responders
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c). HSEEP uses standard terminology and best
practices for a framework of exercise management. The biggest benefit to IHEs for using the
HSEEP process is the connectivity to outside federal, state, and local responders to increase
response efficiency for TVIs. HSEEP provides specific guidance in exercise design,
development, execution, and evaluation, as well as a corrective action program (U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 2013c). The development of a multiyear exercise program for TVIs sets
an IHE up for success towards engaging stakeholders in a series of increasingly complex
exercises (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c). The use of more complex exercises,
such as full scale exercises, allows for a test of the entire campus security plan. The multiple
events occurring simultaneously during a full scale exercise, which normally involve multiple
external stakeholders, is the best method to fully analyze the actions of IHE personnel in
accordance with the campus security plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013c).
Unfortunately, HSEEP full scale exercises are rarely planned and executed due to the cost and
extensive logistical requirements.
The U.S. Department of Education, in collaboration with the Departments of Health and
Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, published a 2013 “Guide for Developing High-Quality
Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education” (U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students,
2013). This preparedness guidance for IHEs is the most comprehensive to date with significant
collaboration among federal agencies. However, the 88 page guide is predominated by operation
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plan recommendations, instead of specific requirements and accountability mechanisms for TVI
planning. This guide concedes that these are unfunded recommendations, not requirements.
According to the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education,
Office of Safe and Healthy Students (2013),
The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and
matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes. The guidance does not
create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or
create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. The information
presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides
examples that may be helpful. (p. 4)
The guidance is not linked to specific federal requirements. However, an IHE that decides to
implement the federal agency recommendation incurs additional burdens on existing or new
staff.
The Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council (HSAAC) was created to provide
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with advice and recommendations on topics related
to higher education (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Some of these topics
include graduate recruitment, academic research, faculty exchange, international students, cyber
security, and campus resilience (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). HSAAC
explains, “A resilient campus fully addresses the needs of its members during natural or manmade disasters and crises by following the phases of national preparedness: protection,
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013a,
p. 3).
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In order to improve campus resilience, HSAAC recommended the creation of a DHS
Campus Resilience Pilot Program.
The goals of the program are to promote FEMA’s Whole Community philosophy, draw
upon existing DHS resources and also those originating from the U.S. Department of
Education (ED) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to help colleges and universities
plan for major man-made or natural incidents. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2013a, p. 3)
IHEs were asked to submit proposals to participate, and a total of seven sites were selected:
Drexel University (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Eastern Connecticut State University
(Willimantic, Connecticut), Green River Community College (Auburn, Washington), Navajo
Technical College (Crownpoint, New Mexico), Texas A&M University (College Station, Texas),
Tougaloo College (Jackson, Mississippi), and the University of San Francisco (San Francisco,
California). According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013b):
DHS will work with the seven selected colleges and universities to draw on existing
resources, collaborate with federal, state and local stakeholders and identify new
innovative approaches to promote campus resilience—directly supporting the goals of the
President’s Plan to Reduce Gun Violence, and making educational institutions safer and
more prepared. “This is an important step in our work with the academic community to
help campuses prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate crisis
and emergency situations,” said Secretary Napolitano. Through their work with DHS,
these colleges and universities will help us further develop best practices, resources and
tools needed to assist campus communities nationwide in their efforts to reduce gun
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violence on campuses and bolster resilience and emergency planning processes for all
types of hazards. (p. 1)
Major findings of the CRS program were reported in the April 22, 2015 briefing
materials: “Based on lessons learned and best practices identified . . . the Department found that
college and university presidents and chancellors are the single most important factor in campus
resilience and emergency planning” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 5). The
report noted that DHS needs to engage with higher education institution presidents and
chancellors and requested input from the HSACC (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2015).
Some of the key outcomes from campus institution leaders noted in the CRS report was
that college and university presidents are tasked with creating a “culture of preparedness” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 10). Future engagements with HSAAC will be very
important to watch with regard to the focus of security preparedness with various levels of
support. Additionally, a web-enabled system is being developed as part of an outcome of the
CRS pilot called the Campus Resilience Enhancement System which will be further developed in
2015 and beyond (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015).
Without significant requirements from the government for campus security planning and
preparedness, institution leadership vested theory is critical towards supporting action guide
implementation. According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Administrators and public safety
officials in higher education are empowered to set policy, direct resources, and facilitate
conditions that develop resilient learning communities” (p. 60). The quality of the programs
supported are directly related to the vested interest of executive administrators, faculty, staff, and
students.
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Given my background in port security for the U.S. Coast Guard, I am familiar with post
9/11 changes in federal guidance regarding the maritime industry. These changes may serve as a
model for the IHEs in the future. The 9/11 attacks spurred the creation of an entirely new federal
department (Department of Homeland Security), the reorganization of several agencies within
DHS (e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard), and the creation of a new agency (the Transportation Security
Administration). Furthermore, the events of 9/11 prompted legislative action in a variety of
modes of transportation, not just air travel, significantly increasing security requirements, and
federal funding. For instance, the U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
was created by Congress to enhance security regulations in conjunction with and/or under the
auspices of the newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Carey, 2004). The MTSA
encompasses specific requirements for security plans and exercises with regard to the maritime
industry and requires all federal, regional, and local agencies to work together with a multitude
of state and private port partners (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). A key element of the MTSA was the
creation of Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) which coordinate federal, state, local,
and industry partnerships (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). Per 33 CFR 103, AMSCs must report to the
U.S. Coast Guard on their activities, which may include the following: port security planners at
the local, regional and national level; port security exercise federal funding; and utilization of the
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) data to prioritize funding projects under the
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP; U.S. Coast Guard, 2013). It has been over 10 years since
the new security requirements for the MTSA were created. The MTSA and its AMSCs represent
a success story regarding maritime security preparedness. According to the U.S. Coast Guard
(2013), AMSCs’ Challenges, Accomplishments, and Best Practices Annual Report (which is
publically available) states:
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Area Maritime [Security] Committees are the foundation of our nation’s maritime
security efforts. The cooperative effort between the private-sector, and the federal, tribal,
state and local agencies is a widely recognized model of successful public-private
partnership, and has built a strong, mature, and comprehensive security regime. Port
areas on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coasts, the Western Rivers, and the Great Lakes
are more secure resilient, and prosperous because of the cooperation, communication, and
the work of Area Maritime Security Committees. (p. 1)
Despite the numerous lives lost and damaged from TVIs on U.S. campuses, there are still
no specific federal regulatory requirements for security preparedness and exercises at IHEs.
Publications from numerous federal agencies provide guidance, yet no legislation exists to
mandate and track security preparedness activities related to TVIs. These recommendations are
strictly voluntary and are not bound to any type of federal requirement or institutional
accreditation. Perhaps the regulations developed for the maritime industry may serve as a model
for IHEs to increase security preparedness and create a funding mechanism to support oversight
and IHE security improvements.
State Guidance for IHE Security Preparedness
The requirements that states have imposed upon IHEs vary from state to state. The
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education created a requirement in 2006 that all schools,
public and private, have some type of armed security (King, 2014). Other recent examples of
increased state requirements for armed officers include Iowa and Massachusetts (King, 2014).
Without specific state or local legislative requirements, the decision whether to arm campus
security personnel is different depending on whether the IHE is public or private (King, 2014).
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Another important difference in IHE security planning response resources is the decisionmaking authority over arming campus and university security forces. Public institutions’
decision-making authority rests with the State Board of Education or the president of the
university (King, 2014). At private institutions, the president of the IHE or the Board of Trustees
is the decision-making authority. Additionally, research in the state of North Carolina found that
sworn police officers have better training and equipment than security guards (North Carolina
Department of Justice, 2008).
Three months after the incident at Virginia Tech, a report was sent to the President of the
United States, from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt; Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Education, Margaret Spellings; and Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, Alberto Gonzales (Leavitt, Spellings, & Gonzales, 2007). One of the major
recommendations was that “Where we know what to do, we have to be better at doing it”
(Leavitt et al., 2007, p. 16). It was noted that while some states had taken advantage of grant
funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice after
the attacks of September 11, 2001 to improve IHE security preparedness, other IHEs had not
transitioned planning efforts from terrorist incidents and natural disasters to active shooter and
other significant contingency incidents on campus (Leavitt et al., 2007).
The report made major recommendations for state and local officials regarding active
shooter preparedness. According to Leavitt et al. (2007), the following actions should be taken:
“Integrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management for schools into overall local and
state emergency planning. Institute regular practice of emergency management response plans
and revise them as issues arise and circumstances change” (p. 17). As much as planning was
stressed in the report, and some investment has been made in communication improvements at
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IHEs, consistent maintenance funding for these systems has been problematic (Leavitt et al.,
2007). According to Leavitt et al. (2007), two major federal recommendations were made:
The U.S. Department of Education should review its information regarding emergency
management planning to ensure it addresses the needs of institutions of higher education
and then disseminate widely. The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice,
jointly and separated, and in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Education, should
consider allowing existing grant programs to be used to facilitate joint training exercises
for state, local, and campus law enforcement. (p. 18)
Also prompted by the shooting at Virginia Tech, the State of North Carolina formed a
Task Force at the direction of its Attorney General. According to North Carolina Department of
Justice (2008), Attorney General Roy Cooper stated,
Our goal is to learn from this horrible event and to use those lessons learned to better
protect our North Carolina campuses. We owe it to the parents, students, faculty, and
staff at our colleges and universities to be ready if a similar tragedy ever happened here.
(p. iii)
One of the findings of the North Carolina Task Force was the need for more TVI training
of faculty, staff, and students at IHEs. The Task Force investigation revealed a clear lack of
understanding of security protocols at Virginia Tech based on two significant events that
worsened the situation. First, the shooter left a note warning of a bomb. The note was found by a
faculty member who took it to the Dean, instead of calling campus police according to university
protocols. Clearly the faculty member was not aware of the response plan, which delayed the
campus security response. Additionally, the perpetrator had chained several of the doors to the
buildings closed to prevent evacuation. Before the rampage began, a student found one of these
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doors chained. Instead of calling campus security to alert them that something was amiss (i.e.,
“see something, say something”), she crawled through a window out of the building (North
Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).
These two instances at Virginia Tech led the North Carolina Task Force to recommend
more faculty, staff, and student training in IHE emergency response plans (North Carolina
Department of Justice, 2008). The North Carolina Task Force conducted quantitative research
analysis in a survey in 2007 with 110 public universities, community colleges, and private
institutions with a 95% response rate (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008). Research by
the Task Force found inconsistencies in the expectations of state emergency management
officials for IHEs and what was actually happening. According to the research, roughly half of
the IHEs studied participated in county or regional preparedness training and 14% of IHEs did
not hold any type of training or exercises (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2008).
However, according to a Director of County Emergency Management, “Campuses must exercise
the plan, fix the gaps in the plan, and review the plan again. Testing of the emergency response
plan ensures that everyone speaks the same language and knows their respective role” (North
Carolina Department of Justice, 2008, p.12). The North Carolina Task Force urged IHEs to
make it standard practice to update emergency plans. It points to FEMA’s guidance on the
challenges of doing long term disaster preparedness (North Carolina Department of Justice,
2008).
In July 2016, the Governor of the State of Michigan signed into law an active shooter
alert bill (Gray, 2016). According to this bill, law enforcement can send texts to citizens in the
vicinity of an active shooter warning them of the danger. The technology is similar to the Amber
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alerts system used to notify people of missing children. The bill was prompted after an active
shooter killed six people in Kalamazoo, MI in February, 2016 (Brenzing & Cunningham, 2016).
As outlined above, TVIs are an unfortunate reality on campuses, specifically at IHEs.
That raises the question, what can be done to stop this or at the very least mitigate the damage?
This question elicits a variety of responses including, but not limited to, developing better
methods to identify a potential attacker prior to the act, increased mental health screening,
enacting tougher gun control laws, restricting access to campuses, allowing concealed weapons
on campus, and improving security planning and preparedness. While these all are important
avenues to pursue with regard to campus safety, I will focus solely on methods to improve
security planning and preparedness for the purposes of this study. If we cannot prevent the
violence from occurring, we can and must at the very least prepare IHE communities to respond
more effectively. The following sections will cover the established methods, as well as several
innovative ones, to enhance overall campus security.
IHE Security Planning and Preparedness
Security planning and preparedness for an active shooter incident (or incident of targeted
violence) is a fundamental element of mitigating the risks to students, staff, and faculty and to
ensure an optimal response to an incident. According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Building
resilience among at-risk student populations, the faculty that educates them, and the staffs that
support them is a moral imperative in a world in which evildoers will continue to prey on those
who appear unprepared to react.” (p. 57).
The core document to prepare and respond to a TVI is a security plan. Even though
awareness has grown since the Virginia Tech, Illinois, and Oregon mass shootings, the lack of
overall crisis management plans is a major problem that impacts institutional operations,
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technology, and infrastructure (Wang & Hutchins, 2010). According to Snyder and Holder
(2015), “The importance of coordinated public safety responses to incidents of targeted violence
that may involve the use of firearms, edged weapons, improvised explosive devices, barricading
tactics, ambush tactics, and fire as a weapon, requires new levels of cooperation” (p. 58). This
cooperation is the centerpiece of security preparedness across higher education with regard to
their partnerships internally and externally. Faculty members, staff, and students should be
considered important stakeholders in IHE security preparedness efforts.
Preparedness activities for active shooter scenarios involve a wide range of actions.
Some of the key activities that ensure implementation of the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) for emergency response include developing security procedures from federal,
state, and local emergency management partners; establishing mutual aid agreements for
resources; identifying prearranged contacts to support active shooter responses; identifying
strategies for lock down procedures; establishing emergency notifications; synchronizing IHE
and local law enforcement to ensure resources are not duplicated; establishing marketing plans
for staff, faculty, and students for active shooter plan review and training; and the assignment of
campus personnel to the Incident Command System (ICS) functions (U.S. Department of
Education, 2010). Note that these are only recommendations from the U.S. Department of
Education and are not required or tracked by any federal government agency.
According to a report from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (2003) on
building a disaster-resistant university, “Campuses vary in their definition of acceptable losses
and interruption because these decisions depend on the community, the nature of the hazard, and
the available resources” (p. 5). Security preparedness is very dependent on the vested interest of
individual institution leaders. The acceptance of the need for security preparedness must start
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with the top officials of higher education institutions. According to Burch and Bratton (2009),
“University administration has key role during emergencies, therefore it is vital to get their input
during the development of the plan. The administration has a different focus than law
enforcement and will assist in developing a more comprehensive plan” (p. 29). Vested interest
in preparing for critical incidents involving violence on campus has many benefits. Effective
updates of security plans and a robust exercise program can lessen the negative impacts of a
crisis event (Jenkins & Goodman, 2015).
Wang and Hutchins (2010) surveyed 350 major college and university provosts who felt
prepared for normal day to day incidents on campus, but not crisis events. The study revealed
gaps in the exercise of higher education security plans and implementation of after action reports
from those exercises that have occurred on campus. Many colleges and universities do not view
the security plan as a dynamic document that should be routinely updated (Cheung et al., 2014).
Security plans must be updated as information and variables change. For example, key IHE
stakeholders may change jobs, new strategies to security responses emerge, and lessons learned
from internal exercises and from other institutions may yield new information (U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 2013c).
Seo et al. (2012) found that even though most colleges have emergency plans in place,
only 25% of campuses believed their students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis.
Even though many colleges and universities have a segment of the institution focused on
emergency preparedness, many recommendations and guidance provided by federal government
agencies to increase preparedness have not been adopted (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2014). Only
62% of police administrators indicated they had any type of plan to react to a security event
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(Davis & Walker, 2005). Additionally, the respondents indicated that most of those plans were
multipurpose and lacked significant depth for security incidents.
Following the 2007 mass shootings at Virginia Tech, the Commonwealth of Virginia and
federal governments called for investigative reports. The “Report of the Review Panel”
presented to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia included information from a myriad
of experts with significant work experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigations, State
Council of Higher Education for Virginia, and most notably The Honorable Tom Ridge, the
former Governor of Pennsylvania and first Secretary of Homeland Security (Virginia Tech
Review Panel, 2007). According to the findings of the “Report the of the Review Panel” the
emergency response plan was deficient in several areas including no specific plans for an active
shooter response, it did not provide police much of a voice in terms of decision making and the
planning process, and the names of many authorities in the plan were out of date and incorrect
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). According to the Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007),
“Shootings at universities are rare events, an average of about 16 a year across 4,000 institutions.
Bombings are rarer but still possible . . . A risk analysis needs to be performed and decisions
made as to what risks to protect against” (p. 18). A review of Virginia Tech’s response planning
before the incident shows that an informal risks analysis was performed by campus
administration in which it determined not to invest in active shooter training, response planning,
and exercises (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
The Virginia Tech shooting was followed by extensive litigation from family members
over negligence by the institution. For example, the families of Erin Peterson and Julia Pryde
sued Virginia Tech for negligence by not issuing timely warnings of the initial shooting incident.
The families were awarded four million dollars (Lenn, 2014). Additionally, Virginia Tech was
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fined $55,000 by the U.S. Department of Education, which later was reversed on appeal (Lenn,
2014).
While Virginia Tech was an example of poor preparation and lack of vested interest, the
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth represents an example of proper planning, preparedness,
and vested interest. In 2013, the Boston Marathon Bombing resulted in the deaths of three
individuals and injuries to at least 264. One of the bombers was enrolled at the nearby
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. During the bombings and the days following, while this
attacker was on the loose, the University had to prepare for multiple scenarios of targeted
violence including an active shooter situation, bombing, or hybrid target violence incident
(Jenkins & Goodman, 2015). Prior exercises had revealed gaps in the institution’s crisis plans
which allowed for plan improvements prior to the incident in 2013 (University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth, 2013). According to Jenkins and Goodman (2015), “The UMass Dartmouth
experience strongly suggests that testing and refining a crisis plan is an effective strategy to
avoid a descent into ad hoc decision making during an emergent crisis situation” (p. 204). Not
only did the emergency responders have a thorough understanding of the crisis plan, but senior
campus officials who had read and exercised the plan also understood the plan which lead to
expedient and informed decisions in response to the incident. Actions by federal and state
agencies during this event averted a potential TVI at an IHE.
Incorporating local emergency management is a critical component of the security
preparedness plan (Burch & Bratton, 2009). It was also noted that access to the emergency
response plan was critical for successful implementation. The U.S. Department of Justice
guidelines recommended that campus law enforcement officials should not just inform students
and faculty about emergency response plans, but also include residents living around IHEs and
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community groups (Burch & Bratton, 2009). However, less than 60% of schools provided a
copy of the campus emergency plan to local law enforcement agencies who might have to
support IHEs in a TVI (Cheung et al., 2014). The lack of higher education security planning
engagement with local responders is not just a problem in the U.S., it is an international problem.
Studies abroad also show gaps in emergency and disaster preparedness. One study of 21 Italian
universities found that very little interaction occurred between higher education personnel and
local civil protection, fire, police, or emergency (Cheung et al., 2014).
On July 22, 2016, Public Law No: 114-199 went into effect that allows public safety
agencies to use federal grant money to pay for active shooter response programs (U.S.
Government Publishing Office, 2016). Known as the POLICE (Protecting Our Lives by
Initiating COPS Expansion) Act of 2016, the measure does not authorize new spending, but
instead expands funding for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to pay for active
shooter training not just for law enforcement officers, but also EMS and fire crews (Wilson,
2016). Having first responders trained in uniform and consistent tactics for active shooter
events, such as the training provided by ALERRT (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response
Training), can improve success when responding to such a crisis.
IHE Security Exercises
Response to a critical incident involving a TVI (or all-hazards incident) is a collaborative
effort among many entities on campus, including campus law enforcement, emergency
management department, student affairs, departmental leaders, faculty, administrative staff,
students, and many other support groups on campus. Engaging in preparedness exercises is an
excellent and critical method to raise the knowledge level of faculty, staff, and students to
respond to a security incident (Eaker & Viars, 2014). Exercising campus security plans can find
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weaknesses that need correction, but more importantly relationships can be established. The
relationships between key stakeholders (e.g., chancellor, provost, head of emergency
management services, campus police chief, and numerous local first responders) is critical to
making good decisions in a short timeframe required in a low-frequency high-risk critical
incident (Jenkins & Goodman, 2015).
Exercises can range from workshops, drills, table top exercises, functional exercises, and
finally full scale exercises. Workshops bring a group of individuals together to build
components of a security plan. Drills help identify issues that need to be addressed in the plan,
as well as plans for communication and response. A drill involves one or only a few community
partners (e.g., law enforcement, fire) and relevant campus staff who use the actual campus
grounds and buildings to practice how to respond to a scenario (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2013c). According to research by Han, Ada, Sharman, and Rao (2015),
Students in focus groups told us that because drills are held to educate students regarding
the actions they need to take in case of building-related incidents, they are likely to
immediately comply with notifications related to these events – they did not perceive any
need to verify the messages content in such an event. (p. 925)
This research supports that exercises and drills can help students in preparing for TVIs and
complying with directives from campus or law enforcement authorities during these incidents.
In a table top exercise, participants, usually emergency responders, discuss an imagined
scenario and how the campus or a department will prepare for, respond to, or recover from an
emergency (U.S. Department of Education, 2007; 2010). Tabletop exercises are recommended
for all critical campus staff that have a function in carrying out the security plan. Training before
and after exercises can also be beneficial for all stakeholders. A functional exercise is similar to
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a drill, but includes more community stakeholders and campus participants. Participants react to
realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb in a residence hall and an intruder with a gun in a
classroom) and implement the plan and procedures using the ICS protocol (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2013c). Finally, a full scale exercise is the most resource intensive activity
in the exercise continuum. A full scale exercise is generally a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional
effort in which all resources are deployed as they would be for an actual critical incident (U.S.
Department of Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and
Healthy Students, 2013).
Following an exercise, an after action report is completed. This report details lessons
learned from an exercise and recommended corrective actions to be placed in the contingency
plan. After action reporting and corrective action guidance is provided by FEMA’s Homeland
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). Four specific overall performance
requirements are part of the HSEEP process. According to the U.S. Department of Education
(2010), the HSEEP requirements are:
Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop and developing and
maintaining a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan. Planning and conducting exercises
in accordance with the guidelines set for in HSEEP, vols. I-III. Planning and conducting
exercises in according with the guidelines set forth in HSEEP, vols. I-III. Developing
and submitting a properly formatted After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (ARR/IP).
The format for the AAR/IP is found in HSEEP, vol. III. Tracking and implement
corrective actions identified on the AAR/IP. (p. 56)
This is a systematic approach that federal and state governments are required to follow for
exercise programs for all contingencies.
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Federal, state, and local exercises follow NIMS, which is utilized at many colleges and
university campuses (Fazzini, 2009). NIMS is the national framework set up to respond to real
world incidents and routine incident management in the United States. HSEEP guidelines for
exercises validate the use of NIMS for planning activities. The greatest incentive for complying
with HSEEP is that the federal government will do a partial cost recovery after a major incident
(Fazzini, 2009). Five steps towards gaining HSEEP exercise compliance include: (a) having a
governing board or institution leadership council initiate the NIMS structure, (b) personnel must
be trained appropriately, (c) all hazard emergency plans must be established, (d) those plans must
be tested, and (e) a continual review process must be established (Fazzini, 2009).
Testing security plans through exercises should be completed with functional to full scale
exercises that can range from a few hours to multiple days. Preparation is critical to effectively
responding to security incidents. According to Frazzano and Snyder (2014),
It is commonly accepted that under stress, most responders will revert to what they have
been trained to do. While it is easy to criticize the choices made during an event, making
instantaneous decisions is a difficult task in which instincts, prior training, and
knowledge come into play. (pp. 4-5)
Many IHEs do not conduct full scale exercises where the entire campus is impacted in an
evacuation or lockdown. Some institutions cite the disruption for conducting exercises on
students as the reason for not doing more to thoroughly test emergency plans (Boynton, 2003).
The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)
conducted a survey to evaluate college and university preparedness to respond to a terrorist
incident (Davis & Walker, 2005). The study showed that only 53.2% of the respondents had
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participated in a mock security exercise. The literature demonstrates a lack of overall focus on
security exercises by IHEs.
In a collaboration between the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance
and the Major Cities Chiefs Association, Burch and Bratton (2009) published “Campus Security
Guidelines.” These guidelines called for increased frequency of emergency response exercises.
According to the 2009 report, “It is imperative the emergency response plan is drilled at least
once a semester with all relevant parities participating. Campus public safety should seek
assistance of local law enforcement and other outside agencies to plan and conduct these
exercises” (p. 31). These guidelines also noted that some university administrators lack the
understanding of the ICS protocol. A 2007 study pointed out that a majority of senior IHE
officials rarely participated in an exercise for a terrorist incident or mass shooting (Wang &
Hutchins, 2010). Local law enforcement was strongly urged to reach out to campus
administrators, encouraging them to sign up and complete ICS courses and participate in campus
exercises (Burch & Bratton, 2009).
Language in the U.S. Department of Education’s (2010) “Action Guide for Emergency
Management at Institutions of Higher Education” puts the importance of exercises at institutional
discretion based on resource availability. Furthermore, it stresses how resource-intensive fullscale exercises can be versus tabletop exercises.
Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher education
institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of time and resources
and collaborative support required to execute the activity balanced against the outcome of
the experience. For example, while a tabletop exercise may be cheaper and less timeconsuming to run, a full scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated
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response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to
implement into plans. (U.S. Department of Education, 2010, p. 52)
The benefits are described, but could be enhanced if risk reduction factors were included in
preventing and responding to TVIs to help justify institution commitment to a robust security
exercise program.
Additional research has shown that many active shooter exercises and drills at IHEs
primarily involve campus police and other local law enforcement agencies (Snyder & Holder,
2015). Students, faculty, and staff are rarely involved in various types of exercises or active
training, yet these are the individuals typically in the front lines of active shooter incidents and
have a high percentage of thwarting attackers (Snyder & Holder, 2015). In Blair and Schweit’s
(2014) analysis of active shooters between 2000 and 2013, they found that 69% (44 of 64) of
incidents, for which the time is known, were concluded in less than five minutes and 23 of those
were completed in less than 2 minutes. In a crisis situation, faculty, students, and staff cannot
simply wait around for law enforcement to arrive.
Marketing is one of the main recommendations to increase interest and enthusiasm across
the spectrum of IHEs to adopt the HSEEP process. Guidance from the U.S. Department of
Education (2010) recommends, “As with all planning and implementation initiatives, there is a
danger that enthusiasm will wane as time passes. An annual review and update process is a way
to combat this problem and renew enthusiasm for a vigorous emergency management program”
(p. 56). The U.S. Department of Education acknowledges a gap in support planning and
exercises. No law, regulation, or accreditation board currently exists to hold IHEs accountable
for active shooter planning and exercises (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). As a result,
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exercise programs are haphazard and rely on marketing of infrastructure improvements or other
media driven outreach from the institution that stresses security preparedness and exercises.
The guidance in the literature for public primary and secondary schools takes a different
approach regarding crisis planning. According to the U.S. Department of Education (2007):
Despite everyone’s best efforts at crisis prevention, it is a certainty that crisis will occur
in schools. Good planning will facilitate a rapid, coordinated, effective response when a
crisis occurs. Being well prepared involves an investment of time and resources-but the
potential to reduce injury and save lives is well worth the effort. Every school needs a
crisis plan that is tailored to its unique characteristics. Within a school district, however,
it is necessary for all plans to have certain commonalities. (p. 3-1)
The language used here is much stronger regarding the need for consistency and competency in
planning and training. In contrast, the recommendations for IHEs issued by the U.S. Department
of Education (2010) are much more open ended.
Another important aspect of campus preparedness is the level of commitment to training.
Campus personnel must train with the same commitment as if they were in an actual emergency.
Blair et al. (2013) describe the “One Warrior’s Creed” written by a military and law enforcement
officer, Steven Randy Watt: “If you seek to do battle with me this day you will receive the best
that I am capable of giving . . . I have trained, drilled, and rehearsed my actions so that I might
have the best chance of defeating you” (p. 77). Exercises should be performed as if your life
and/or the lives of those around you depended on it and not just a box to check off to
demonstrate a task was completed. Exercise planners must maintain proficiency and maintain
the strongest commitment to exercise objectives followed by drafting excellent lessons learned
reports.
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IHE Security Accreditation
IHE safety and security accreditation may be obtained through two nonprofit law
enforcement organizations to help provide independent standards and verification of campus
security preparedness. The first of these is the Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the second is the International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA). The CALEA standards are specific to law enforcement
agencies in general. While CALEA also has developed IHE specific accreditation certification
guidelines, IACLEA is solely focused on campus law enforcement administrators and campus
security plans and exercises. IACLEA accreditation provides a higher standard above the HEOA
of 2008 requirements.
The U.S. Department of Justice (2005) addressed the lack of accreditation in campus
safety and security, “While campus police departments may pursue CALEA accreditation,
certain characteristics and functions unique to campus operations are not addressed in the
broader police standards” (p. 45). As a result, the U.S. Department of Justice (2005)
recommended nationally recognized standards for campus safety and security during the
National Summit on Campus Public Safety in December of 2004. The summit was coordinated
by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
COPS selected delegates based on their extensive expertise in campus safety and security and
other delegates were selected from key areas across the campus including student services,
administrators, and student organizations. The summit produced an extensive list of strategies
for colleges and universities in a homeland security environment. One of the key
recommendations produced by this summit is that, “National standards, similar to those of the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA), should be
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developed and implemented to guide campus police and security operations and enhance the
profession” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005, p. 55). The COPS office awarded a grant to the
IACLEA to help develop standards applicable to IHEs nationwide (U.S. Department of Justice,
2005).
IACLEA developed 210 standards in collaboration with numerous state law enforcement
accreditation agencies, including The Georgia Law Enforcement Accreditation and the Texas
Police Chiefs Association Foundation (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement
Administrators, 2015). The benefits of accreditation as described by the International
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (2015), are as follows:
Accreditation does not purport that one agency provides better services to its campus than
a non-accredited agency. What it does signify is that the accredited agency was carefully
measured against an established set of standards and has met or exceeded accepted
practices in campus public safety. (p. iii)
IACLEA Accreditation Commission oversees accreditation standards. It is comprised of 12
voluntary members from a diverse representative of campus communities across the nation, and
from public and private IHEs, as well as sworn and non-sworn agencies (International
Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015). Additionally, membership
within the Accreditation Commission includes representatives from other higher education
associations, including American Council of Education, the National Association of Student
Personnel Administrators, and the National Association of College and University Business
Officers (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015). These
additional members ensure a broad spectrum of campus safety professionals with input and
connectivity to the accreditation process.
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Upon receipt of accreditation, IHEs must adhere to annual reporting requirements and
reapply for accreditation every four years (International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators, 2015). IACLEA accreditation standards cover a broad spectrum of
campus safety issues, ranging from traffic and parking to critical incident management. Critical
incident management is the focus of analysis in this review as it relates to TVIs. IACLEA’s
accreditation requirements regarding critical incident management are consistent with the
requirements of the HEOA of 2008 (J. Leonard, personal communication, January, 16, 2016).
Furthermore, these requirements include more specific planning beyond the basic requirements
of the HEOA of 2008 regarding testing emergency response and evacuation procedures.
According to IACLEA’s accreditation standards, “The plan should also identify responsibilities
of all command and general staff positions in a critical incident as they relate to the command,
operations, planning and logistics and finance/administration sections” (International Association
of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015, p. 72). These requirements follow the
NIMS and the ICS protocol consistent with national federal agency guidance. Section 17.1.3 of
the accreditation standards requires an annual review of all hazards that should be integrated with
specific institutional response plans for various TVIs (International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators, 2015).
As of January 2015, only 43 institutions of the 1,200 IACLEA members had obtained
IACLEA accreditation per an IACLEA representative (J. Leonard, personal communication,
January, 16, 2016). Why have so few members of IACLEA, let alone non-members, sought
accreditation? The accreditation process is less than 10 years old, it is time consuming for
campus law enforcement and emergency management representatives, and it comes at a cost (J.
Leonard, personal communication, January, 16, 2016). The cost of accreditation depends on the
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size of the IHE. For those IHEs with less than 10,000 students, the cost of accreditation is
$3,000 the first year and $2,500 every year thereafter (International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators, 2015). IHEs with 10,000 or more students, the cost is $3,000 per
year for the accreditation and the annual review process (International Association of Campus
Law Enforcement Administrators, 2015).
In the interest of proactively and effectively protecting the entire campus community, as
well as protecting the institution itself from liability issues, IHEs should be invested in obtaining
accreditation to improve campus response and planning to TVIs. Jenkins and Goodman (2015)
comment on the role of IHEs and campus safety, illustrating the importance of vested interest in
security preparedness:
Parents and guardians send their children to college with the understanding that these
institutions are committed to the safety and welfare of their children, and indeed, case law
has recognized this responsibility . . . The loss of credibility that stems from an
ineffective crisis response may lead to devastating consequences to the institution. (pp.
208-209)
Challenges and Supplements to Security Preparedness
While campus preparedness resource investments have increased somewhat over the last
20 years, the focus has been on improving mass communications with limited support given to
other preparedness activities (Schafer et al., 2010). Email and text messaging have become a
cornerstone of communications at IHEs. Most campus security preparedness after the Virginia
Tech incident focused on implementing communications. For example, Holyoke Community
College (HCC) increased security spending from $400,000 in 2001 to $700,000 in 2010
(Violino, 2010). HCC instituted new programs on campus including an emergency phone
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internet protocol system for messaging throughout the college. Ivy Tech Community College
made numerous security improvements including installing a closed circuit TV system,
notification technology, emergency call stations, and enhanced police presence 24/7 on campus
(Violino, 2010). Research has shown that at Southern Ontario University, 95.6% of students
indicated they would be in favor of instituting a mass notification system. Data regarding
technology use during the study showed that 61.4% of students and 82.8% of faculty members
check email routinely during the day and over 80% have their university emails forwarded to
them if personal email is primarily used (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). Additionally, it was
reported that over 80% of students owned a cell phone.
Research in Florida and North Carolina showed similarly positive responses to the use of
warning messages through text messages and emails (Sattler et al., 2011). Students also made a
cultural shift by participating in voluntary security notification programs after the Virginia Tech
incident. For example, Princeton University instituted an emergency notification program in
2006, utilizing texts and phone calls during emergencies, but the student participation rate was
very low (Selingo, 2008). However, after the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007, over 90% of the
incoming freshmen signed up for Princeton’s emergency notification program (Selingo, 2008).
Despite the positive reception of the use of mass communication for emergencies on campus,
limited research has been done on the effectiveness of these systems to date (Sattler et al., 2011).
Significant gaps still exist in resource support to train faculty and staff in campus security
preparedness (Eaker & Viars, 2014). The investments in campus security that have been made
since the Virginia Tech incident have not been integrated in security planning and exercises at
many institutions. According to Snyder and Holder (2015), “Investments in TVI related training,
technology, and policies consume considerable resources and have increased for many
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universities following the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre” (p. 57). Simply purchasing technology
without adequate planning can be problematic (McIntire & Wexler, 2015). For instance, do the
nearby cell towers have the capacity to handle thousands of mass notifications via text messaging
in the event of an incident? Campus security investments are mostly subject to cost-benefit
analysis (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). According to a survey in 2008 after the Virginia Tech
incident, less than 10% of respondents noted that their institution had received some level of
outside funding to help cover the cost of safety and security related efforts, initiatives, and
purchases. Security investment benefits can be difficult to analyze for an institution that has
never had a TVI.
Despite the enormous safety and liability issues, numerous state legislatures have debated
the potential of allowing guns on campus (Lipka, 2008a). As of January 2015, the following
states are reviewing proposed legislation to overturn policies banning students, faculty, and staff
from carrying licensed, concealed handguns on campus: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington (Bouffard, Nobles, Wells, &
Cavanaugh, 2012). The State of Ohio passed a law allowing guns on the state’s higher education
campuses, but required guns to be stored in storage facilities and or locked in parked cars on
campus (Lipka, 2008b). Many IHEs have used the Supreme Court rulings to justify the ban on
concealed weapons. The Supreme Court has upheld that a school is not a student’s home as he
or she does not rent space there, and therefore, cannot carry a concealed weapon (Cramer, 2014).
Virginia Tech had prohibited anyone from carrying firearms on campus, regardless of
special permits to carry a concealed weapon (Cramer, 2014). Following the Virginia Tech
incident the campus organization, Students for Concealed Carry (SCC) was formed. The
primary mission of the SCC was to change attitudes regarding carrying a concealed weapon on
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campus (Cramer, 2014). The members of the SCC believed that the absence of firearms on
campus, in the hands of licensed and permitted individuals, increased the vulnerability and risk
from the growing number of active shooter incidents on IHEs (Cramer, 2014). As in Virginia,
many IHEs in Oregon were supportive of gun bans and gun free zones on campus, including
Umpqua Community College. Only one unarmed security guard was present at Umpqua
Community College during the shootings in 2015 (McIntire & Wexler, 2015).
Summary
A gap in the literature exists regarding the readiness of IHEs’ implementation and
maintenance of strong security preparedness for future TVIs. The available scholarly research
and federal agency security preparedness guidance to colleges and universities has been
presented in the literature review. Numerous studies before the large scale shooting incidents at
Virginia Tech and North Illinois University demonstrated the infrequency of campus security
exercises. There has been no appreciable increase in security exercise frequency even afterwards
based on a review of the literature. While a large percentage of IHEs have a security plan, the
implementation of the plan is not regulated or supported with direct federal funding and is
therefore haphazard and independent of each IHEs’ priorities and missions. As resources
continue to dwindle at many IHEs, best practices that minimize cost and maximize preparedness
in TVI planning, exercise development and execution, and incorporation of exercise lessons
learned must be a top priority. My goal throughout this research study was to identify barriers to
and best practices of campus security planning and exercises that will allow IHEs to better
prepare and respond to TVIs.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Overview
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to determine themes, including
barriers to and best practices for planning and exercises regarding TVI security preparedness at
IHEs. Assembling detailed and thorough information through established case study data
collection strategies ensured the maximum results through the data analysis process. The
sections that follow describe the design of the study, as well as research questions, participants,
procedures, data collection, and data analysis.
Design
Five commonly used qualitative research designs include narrative study,
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study (Creswell, 2013). A narrative
approach is more appropriate for an analysis of an individual’s life story, dealing in oral and/or
written forms of communication. Phenomenology pertains to the “essence” of an experience by
examining people who have shared the experience through interviews. Grounded theory
generates an explanation for an action as described by a large number of individuals who have
experienced the action. Ethnography is an approach centered on understanding the culture of a
group. A case study approach allows for an in-depth analysis of a particular topic using
interviews, observations, and documentation.as forms of data collection (Creswell, 2013). I have
chosen the case study approach for this research study as it allows for an in depth focus on one or
more cases of a topic, in this case, security preparedness for TVIs at IHEs. A case study design
allowed me to utilize a variety of data sources, rather than being limited to the perspectives of
selected interviewees.
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Qualitative case study research can be completed using three different methods, which
include single case study, collective case study, and intrinsic case study. Single case study
research looks only at one issue and selects the best bounded case available (Creswell, 2013). A
collective case study also only looks at one issue, but choses two bounded cases to research the
issue (Creswell, 2013). Lastly, with an intrinsic case study there is an evaluation of a bounded
case itself without choosing a specific issue (Creswell, 2013). In order to optimize the results of
this study, I chose a collective case study, as opposed to a single case study. With just one
bounded case (i.e., institution) in the study, there is a greater potential to miss out on best
practices or to discover barriers to security preparedness (Yin, 2014).
I researched potential IHEs to participate in this study based on their demonstrated vested
interest in TVI preparedness to determine nationwide best practices. The collective approach
was completed at two institutions that granted me access to their site documentation, allowed me
to observe their exercises, and agreed to conduct interviews with key institutional stakeholders.
Creswell (2013) provides three key benchmark questions for the case study approach: “Does the
report have a conceptual structure (i.e., themes or issues)? Were sufficient raw data presented?
Do observations and interpretations appear to have been triangulated” (p. 264)? I employed
these collective case study benchmarks to ensure thorough data collection at each institution.
Furthermore, I utilized several of the six data collection procedures recommended by Yin (2014).
Research Questions
The following are the research questions I developed to help form interview questions:
(a) How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance of various types of
exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale) for the campus security plan?
(b) How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for overall preparedness to respond
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to large-scale acts of violence with multiple student injuries and loss of life? (c) How are
previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus security plan?
(d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators consistently remain
focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness? (e) Would new legislation
that regulated IHE security plans and exercises increase the level of overall IHE security
preparedness? By synthesizing participants’ answers to these questions, I developed
recommendations to increase campus preparedness.
Setting
For the purposes of this study, I chose to include only four year private and public IHEs
to maintain consistency among settings. The setting of this collective case study was at two
IHEs located along the East Coast of the United States. To maintain anonymity, I use the
pseudonym designation of Alpha for the first IHE and Bravo for the second.
Alpha Institution is located in a city with a population of 104,870. Undergraduate and
graduate enrollments, as of the Fall 2014 semester, were 12,993 and 1,618, respectively. The
average age of undergraduate students was 22 years, with only 14% aged 25 and older. The
student body is comprised of 62.4% females and 37.6% males. According to the demographics
from the Fall 2014 semester, ethnicity of enrolled students was broken down as follows:
American Indian/Alaskan Native <1%, Asian 2%, African American/Black 5%, Hispanic 7%,
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander <1%, White 79%, two or more races 3%, international
1%, race/ethnicity not reported 3%. Students from out of state comprised 17.9% of the student
body, while in-state students comprised 82.1%. The institution has a staff of 1,250, with 612
full-time faculty and 273 part-time faculty. It offers a total of 49 majors at the bachelor level and
42 majors at the master level.
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Bravo Institution is located in a large metropolitan city with a population of 1.55 million.
The institution enrolls a total of 26,359 students, of which 16,896 are undergraduates, 9,463 are
graduate students, and 5,284 are online students. The average age of students is 23 years.
Females comprise 46.7% of the student body, while males comprise 53.3%. As of the Fall 2014
semester, reported ethnicity of students from the U.S. is as follows: American Indian/ Alaskan
Native 0.2%, Asian 15.1%, African-American/Black 7.5%, Hispanic/Latino 6.8%, multi-race
(not Hispanic/Latino) 3.3%, Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 0.7%, White 63.8%, unknown
2.6%. The student body also contains 12.8% international students from 121 countries. Bravo
Institution offers 200 degree programs within its 15 colleges.
Participants
Purposeful sampling was the method I used to locate two institutions with a high level of
engagement in security preparedness as determined via available documentation researched
online. Using purposeful sampling is the most efficient sampling, where the best institutions
could be selected that will inform the study (Creswell, 2013). I established contact with both the
Alpha and Bravo Schools regarding their desire to participate in this study and received an
overwhelming level of enthusiasm from each. Campus personnel that I intended to interview
included faculty, the Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, other representative of Student
Affairs, senior representative of the Safety and Security Department, and a senior representative
of the police or security personnel.
Procedures
The procedures for the study followed a systematic process. First, I completed the
research prospectus at the beginning of EDUC 989 in the spring semester of 2016. The
prospectus included application documentation for IRB approval. Once IRB approval was
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granted for the research plan, and both the dissertation chair and other committee members have
given approval, I began the collection of data recruitment and informed consent, according to the
dissertation timeline (see Appendix A). Initially, I conducted research via publicly accessible
websites to gain information on the participating IHEs’ background information on emergency
response information, and detailed information regarding the best stakeholders to interview.
After the two institutions provided written consent to participate in the research study, I began
data collection in the spring of 2016. Data collection strategies I used include site documentation
review, participant observations, and interviews. This data collection strategy maximized the
collection of potential security preparedness best practices. Identified best practices for
increasing vested theory in campus security preparedness was discussed with key institution
stakeholders during the interview phase of data collection. Participating individuals from each
IHE were given pseudonyms. After completion of the data collection process, I began analysis
as described in the research plan.
The Researcher's Role
As a member of the U.S. Coast Guard for the past 18 years, I have developed an expertise
in contingency planning, exercise planning, and execution for all types of hazards. Members of
the U.S. Coast Guard are required to meet exacting standards and rigor in contingency planning.
However, I am well aware that the rest of society does not always follow these strict guidelines.
My professional background in mandated port security planning and exercises should not be a
bias because the overall federal guidelines recommended for IHEs are very similar. My faith
guides me as an individual, husband, father to my two children, professional, and doctoral
student conducting this qualitative study.
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Data Collection
I used the triangulation method in the analysis of site documentation (i.e., security plans,
preparedness training activities, and review of after action reports), observations, and interviews
of different groups of campus stakeholders. The convergence of multiple data sources (i.e.,
triangulation of several sources of data) is in accordance with Yin’s (2014) description of case
study design. I chose the following sequence of data collection to maximize baseline
information on each institution’s security planning and exercise process, which in turn allowed
for the most effective information exchange during interviews with IHE participants:
Step 1: I contacted prospective participant universities via email and provided them with
a copy of the Liberty University IRB template with specific request for institution participation
(see Appendix E). Agreements to participate from the institutions are required via signed letter
on institutional letterhead or via email response to me.
Step 2: I requested the security plans (focused on active shooter response) of each
institution for review at either the IHE or remotely. Upon access to the information, I conducted
a thorough review of the IHE security plan.
Step 3: Documentation of previous TVI exercises (with emphasis on active shooter
response), including lessons learned, was requested for my review either at the IHE or remotely.
Step 4: I conducted observations of security exercises and planning meetings completed
in the timeframe of research data collection.
Step 5: I conducted field interviews using interview questions geared toward specific
types of participants (refer to Appendix B).
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Site Documentation Review
Site documentation is a qualitative data collection strategy of reviewing reports,
administrative documents, evaluations, and numerous other external and internal IHE
information (Yin, 2014). Site documentation is important in this study to corroborate
information from many different sources regarding IHE security preparedness activities and
determined overall best practices (Yin, 2014). I began with a thorough review of site
documentation, including security plans, in accordance with federally recommended guidelines
from FEMA, DOE, and other federal agencies. I surveyed the data for themes and issues across
both cases to determine the similarities, differences, and major gaps in each plan (Creswell,
2013). The federal Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Plan (HSEEP) was developed to
implement standardization in developing and executing exercises in a broad range of
contingencies, from hurricane response to campus TVI events (Altizer, 2008). Exercise after
action reports were analyzed by me to determine if they follow the HSEEP protocols. I reviewed
each participating IHEs’ publicly available documentation pertaining to active shooter plan
development, exercise frequency, and outreach to the public.
Site documentation data collected helped determine how vested each of the two
institutions are in the HSEEP program. For instance, do they have periodic TVI active shooter
exercises? If institutions have TVI active shooter exercises, then lessons learned can be
reviewed, and best practices collected. The collection of exercise data is critical to analyzing
which best practices increase IHE vested theory in security preparedness.
Participant Observations
Participant observations are another collective case study method to collect evidence on a
real-world topic (Yin, 2014). Observations are very important in qualitative research as a key
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data collection technique (Creswell, 2013). Activities utilized in data collection can include
observations about a specific setting, individual participants, activities, interactions, and
conversations (Creswell, 2013). Participant observations could be formal or informal based on
the availability of IHE security preparedness activities over the data collection period. Security
preparedness activities that I targeted for observation include security plan review, active shooter
exercise development, exercise planning meetings, student active shooter training, or other
associated activities. I wanted to observe these preparedness activities to determine the
institution’s campus security plan knowledge, actions to be taken during an active shooter
incident, understanding of Incident Command System (ICS), and other preparedness activities as
recommended by the U.S. Department of Education, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and other federal agencies. I took notes during the security preparedness activities. I recorded
relevant information on the Observation Protocol Form (see Appendix D; Creswell, 2013). The
main point of contact at each participating IHE introduced me to the participants during the
preparedness activity (Creswell, 2013).
Interviews
Interviews are one of the most important elements of qualitative case study research and
include structured questions according to approved protocols that are proposed in an unbiased
manner (Yin, 2014). I used the purposeful sampling technique to find key participants to
interview, including campus security staff and administrators in a guided conversation or openended question format (Yin, 2014). Noor (2008) comments on the semi-structured interview:
“As the interview was the primary data gathering instrument for the research a semi-structured
interview was chosen where questions were carefully designed to provide adequate coverage for
the purpose of the research” (p. 1603). The use of semi-structured and open-ended questions
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helped me solicit a narrative response and develop a story about security preparedness at each
institution (Creswell, 2013).
To begin, I obtained interview consent from each interviewee. The interview protocol
followed a specific format (see Appendix C), as I developed different interview questions for the
various stakeholders (see Appendix B) as recommended in Creswell (2013). I followed Yin’s
(2014) protocol for short case study interviews and did not exceed an hour in duration. I
conducted interviews with the participants in person. The primary interview technique was in
person on the respective campuses at a site of the subject’s choosing. I documented the
interviews with the use of a digital audio recorder device. Additionally, I kept hand-written
researcher notes of each interview. Finally, I personally transcribed the interviews into Word
documents and saved these to my secured password protected home computer (Creswell, 2013).
Research questions (a-e) were addressed by the interview questions (refer to Appendix B) via
this data collection strategy.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was completed using a variety of established case study method strategies
in a sequenced order of completion as listed below.
Step 1: A primary data analysis tool in qualitative research is memoing, which I used in
this study for plan and exercise review, site observations, and interviews. Memoing includes
writing notes (key phrases and ideas) in the margins of interview transcripts (Creswell, 2013).
After reading each interview transcript, I completed the memoing process for all participants at
the two institutions. Initial categories were created, not exceeding 10 (Creswell, 2013).
Step 2: Coding of data includes reviewing the transcript text for specific key codes that
can be developed from memoing (Creswell, 2013). Using Ethnograph, a qualitative data analysis
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software, I coded the data to search for key words, count the number of times these words were
used, and conducted Boolean searches to match information (Yin, 2014).
Step 3: Using theoretical prepositions that are a cornerstone of qualitative data inquiry
(Yin, 2014), I executed the data analysis strategy. The theoretical preposition used in this case
study was vested theory. The objective of my study design was to determine how IHEs could
become more vested with security preparedness activities.
Step 4: The analytical technique for qualitative case studies that I chose, the cross case
synthesis, is one of five techniques described by Yin (2014). A primary method of analysis
between two cases is the use of word tables to display information and compare cases (Yin,
2014). Similarities and contrasts can be determined by using word tables (Yin, 2014). My plan
was to develop recommendations for IHEs that maximize security preparedness and are
attractive for adoption by IHEs. These recommendations must incorporate methods to change
attitudes and behaviors at IHEs to make security preparedness for an active shooter event firmly
rooted into the campus culture.
Step 5: Quality control of data analysis was completed by several different methods.
First, all observations, site documentation, and transcripts were fully reviewed (Yin, 2014). I
completely reviewed all critical evidence twice during the analysis process (Yin, 2014). Next, it
is important in case study research to look at the rival interpretation (Yin, 2014). As a result, I
considered the philosophy of not conducting security preparedness activities due to high resource
investment as a rival position. Third, the most important part of case study research analysis is
to stay focused on key ideas and not get distracted by less important information (Yin, 2014). I
remained focused on the most significant aspects of the case by ensuring the research questions
were completely addressed in the data analysis process. Lastly, according to Yin (2014), “You
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should use your own prior, expert knowledge in your case study” (p.168). I utilized my expertise
in contingency planning and exercises in collecting and analyzing the case study.
Trustworthiness
The accuracy of the findings of this qualitative study were improved by using several
strategies that build trustworthiness (Creswell, 2013). These strategies include credibility,
dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Creswell, 2013). Trustworthiness of research
is critical for new and experienced researchers. Additionally, having a member of the
dissertation committee who is an expert in hybrid target violence helped the overall
trustworthiness of the research study.
Credibility
Credibility inspires belief in a research study. Building credibility in a study is an
important tool to ensure overall trustworthiness in a study. Prolonged engagement with subjects
and persistent observations are methods to build credibility (Creswell, 2013). This was
accomplished by prolonged engagement with the two institutions involved in the case study and
providing researcher availability to short-fused scheduled activities in campus security
preparedness.
I used member checks with the participants to ensure I obtained accurate information
(Creswell, 2013). The process of member checks was followed as described in Yin (2014).
Triangulation of different data sources of data collection was used to determine the most
appropriate behaviors to increase focus on active shooter planning and exercises (Creswell,
2013). I gave a clear picture of past experiences in safety and security planning to all
participants.
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Dependability
Dependability is the capability of being depended on. Dependability was enhanced by
my detailed note taking during the entire research study and tape recording interviews and
observations whenever possible (Creswell, 2013). From this information, I derived key
quotations from participants (Creswell, 2013). Additionally, subjects were given the opportunity
to review all notes or transcripts developed from interviews. Peer debriefing sessions are an
excellent method to ensure that security preparedness methods and motivations are clearly
understood (Creswell, 2013).
Transferability
Transferability is the ability to take a research method in one study and apply it to another
study. Transferability was enhanced by my use of the thick description process during the data
analysis phase, which describes the campus participant’s position at the institution (Creswell,
2013). Not only does the study include commonplace descriptions, but it also includes
descriptions of places, events, and people as described by the subjects, who, according to Stake
(1995), “are the most knowledgeable about the case” (p. 102). Thick descriptions used in the
study incorporate standard planning and exercise language from the DOE and FEMA in order to
allow security preparedness information to be easily transferred to a larger IHE population
(Creswell, 2013).
Confirmability
I asked an outside consultant, one that was not involved in the study, with a background
in hybrid target violence to review the research proposal and results to determine if conclusions
are supported by the data collected (Creswell, 2013). The expert review of findings,
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interpretations, and conclusions of the study greatly increased the confirmability of this study
(Creswell, 2013).
Ethical Consideration
Ethical considerations include my receipt of authorization to access institutional
participants. Prior to conducting the study, I obtained the institution’s approval in writing. I
thoroughly explained the process of the research study and indicated that participation is
voluntary. Privacy concerns of study participants is a priority. As a result, all research
participants were given pseudonyms and I reviewed the data to ensure easily recognized
identifiers that could be applied to research participants or the institutions were removed. Lastly,
following the exact procedures detailed in the Liberty University IRB guidelines was crucial in
maintaining the integrity of the study. Upon meeting a potential participant, I provided them
with an Informed Consent form. Furthermore, I notified each individual that participation in this
research study was strictly voluntary and participants had the right to withdraw at any time.
Research data were backed up to portable thumb drives which were stored in a lock box in my
home (Creswell, 2013). Lastly, the digital audio recorder with interviews and information were
also kept in a lock box in my home.
Summary
In conclusion, the methodology of this study is a qualitative collective case study design.
Triangulation of data was completed using site documentation, observations, and field
interviews. Participant selection, collection of data, and the analysis of data was completed in
accordance with Liberty University IRB guidelines. Trustworthiness was a top priority of my
research study and I made every attempt to avoid any potential ethical issues.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of this study. Data were collected
from two institutions and include information gathered from campus security plans (including a
review of after action reports) and observations of preparedness training activities. Memoing
was completed on each campus security plan, exercise after action report, and observation notes.
Additional data were gathered from field interviews of different campus stakeholders.
Purposeful sampling techniques were used to target key participants to interview, including
administrators, faculty, emergency managers, and campus security staff. The interviews were
held in a guided conversation or open-ended question format (Yin, 2014). Data from the
interviews were organized into two categories of interviewees: administrators/faculty and
emergency managers/police for each institution case study.
The purpose of this qualitative collective case study was to discover barriers to campus
security preparedness for TVIs and determine the most successful tactics to incorporate
preparedness throughout all IHEs. The most relevant themes developed from analysis of the data
include hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interest. For the purposes of
this study, I define these themes as follows: hindrances are barriers to security preparedness
activities; a recommendation is a suggestion by an interviewee to improve conditions at the IHE;
best practices are exceptional actions taken at the IHE previously and currently; vested interest
are actions that may increase IHE participation in security preparedness.
Participants
Purposeful sampling was the method I used to locate two institutions with a high level of
engagement in security preparedness as determined via available documentation researched
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online. For the purpose of anonymity, these institutions are referred to throughout this study as
Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution. It is very important to emphasize both institutions were
selected based on excellent campus security preparedness programs as determined upon my
review of the literature. One of the institutions has a campus security certification from the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). The CALEA campus
security certification is described as,
A proven modern management model; once implemented, it presents the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO), on a continuing basis, with a blueprint that promotes the efficient use of
resources and improves service delivery - regardless of the size, geographic location, or
functional responsibilities of the agency. (Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies, 2016)
The other institution has a Disaster Resistant University (DRU) designation assigned by FEMA.
The Disaster Resistant University program is a guide developed from the work of six universities
and colleges that have addressed their preparedness for any incident to become more “disasterresistant” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003).
Purposeful sampling was also the method used to acquire subjects for the interview
portion of this study. This sampling yielded six interviews at Alpha Institution and four at Bravo
Institution, for a total of 10 interviews. I included participants from the faculty, administrators
(e.g., Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, other representative of Student Affairs), senior
representatives of the Emergency Management Departments, and a senior representative of the
campus police. An interview of each representative from each category was completed, with the
exception of a faculty member at Bravo Institution. Several faculty members were contacted and
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either never responded to emails or were not available. The interviewees are listed in Table 2
with alphanumeric indicators in place of names.

Table 2
List of interview participants with respective roles and institutions
Interviewee

Date

Interviewee’s Role

Institution

A7

Emergency Manager/Police

Bravo

3/15/2016

A8

Emergency Manager/Police

Alpha

5/16/2016

A9

Administrator/Faculty

Alpha

5/16/2016

A10

Administrator/Faculty

Alpha

5/16/2016

A11

Emergency Manager/Police

Alpha

5/16/2016

A13

Emergency Manager/Police

Alpha

5/17/2016

A14

Administrator/Faculty

Alpha

5/17/2016

A15

Emergency Manager/Police

Bravo

6/14/2016

A16

Emergency Manager/Police

Bravo

6/27/2016

A17

Administrator/Faculty

Bravo

6/28/2016

Pseudonym

Interviewed

Results
The following is a brief summary of each type of data: site documentation review,
observations, and interviews. Site documentation review was completed at both institutions with
a focus on collecting data to address the research questions. The documentation review was used
to corroborate information from many different sources regarding IHE security preparedness
activities and determine overall best practices (Yin, 2014). Types of documentation reviewed at
both institutions include Campus Security Plan Review, preparedness training activities, and a
review of exercise after action reports.

93
Observation of campus exercises was conducted at Bravo Institution only. I had hoped to
schedule an observation at Alpha Institution, however, none were scheduled during the data
collection phase of this study. A three hour campus safety exercise was observed at Bravo
Institution in April 2016.
A total of 10 interviews were conducted using the interview protocol listed in Appendix
C. Interviewees were given one of two sets of similar questions (see Appendix B), but which
were worded differently depending on their role within the institution. For instance,
administrators and faculty were given a list of questions slightly different from those given to
emergency managers and police. Note that in the original design of the Interview Questions in
Appendix B, “Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs” was the category for one set of
questions and “Campus Emergency Managers and Senior Police Representative” for the other
set. During the data collection phase, I included faculty and other administrative staff in the
interview process, so the “Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs” group was renamed
“Administrators and Faculty.” All interviews were conducted in person with the use of a
digital audio recorder device and in accordance with the Liberty University IRB requirements.
The data are outlined and triangulated below, organized by research question (a-e). Table 3
illustrates the relationship between the five research questions detailed in Chapter One and the
corresponding interview questions (see Appendix B) designed to answer each.
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Table 3
Research Questions with corresponding Interview Questions

Administrator/Faculty
Interview Question
Number

Emergency
Manager/Police
Interview Question
Number

(a) How do institutions integrate federal agency
multiyear exercise guidance of various types of
exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop,
functional, and full scale) for the campus
security plan?

1

1, 2, 3, 6

(b) How are exercises of the campus security
plan measured for overall preparedness to
respond to a large-scale active shooter
incident with multiple student injuries and loss
of life?

2, 3

4, 6

(c) How are previous TVI exercise lessons used
in follow-on exercises or updates to a campus
security plan?

4, 5, 6

5 (n.b., moved from
(a) to (c)), 6

(d) How can the attitudes and behaviors of
faculty, staff, and administrators consistently be
focused on investing in active shooter overall
campus preparedness?

7

7, 8

(e) Would new legislation that regulated IHE
security plans and exercises increase the level
of overall IHE security preparedness?

8

9

Research Question

All interviews were transcribed and sent to the interviewee for review and comment.
None of the interviewees replied with comments. Transcriptions of the field interviews were
uploaded into the qualitative software data analysis package, Ethnograph, 6.0, by Qualis
Research, for analysis. Code words and/or phrases were identified and aggregated, from which I
identified four consistent themes within the data: hindrances, recommendations, best practices,
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and vested interest. Table 4 lists the counts of these themes separated by the role of the
interviewee.

Table 4
Counts of themes found in interviews
Themes
Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Vested
Interest

Administrators/
Faculty

14

23

20

9

Emergency
Managers/ Police

39

17

48

8

Role of Interviewee

Each research question (a-e) is listed below, followed by the relevant data from the site
documentation review, observations, and interviews. Data from the interviews are presented in
Tables 5–23 and are organized by the interview questions linked to each research question.
These tables list the key phrases or codes derived from an analysis of the interview data along
with the corresponding theme and institutional affiliation. A summary of each Research
Question follows at the end of each data set.
Research Question (a) Results
Research Question (a). How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise
guidance of various types of exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale)
for the campus security plan?
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Site documentation review. Alpha Institution’s emergency operations plan is a blend of
federal agency planning guidance and connected to local and state partners in emergency support
functions. The base Emergency Operation Plan (EOP) complies with the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Bravo Institution’s security plan links individual building playbooks, which are
maintained electronically on the institution’s website. The building playbooks are developed for
all hazard contingencies, reviewed, and approved by the institution’s authorities. An exercise is
then scheduled which may lead to the creation or major update of a building playbook.
Alpha Institution has a variety of preparedness training activities conducted through both
the campus police department and the health and safety department. Many of these training
activities are incorporated into exercises using the HSEEP process for campus security plan
exercises. Bravo Institution also has a variety of preparedness training activities available from
campus police or campus emergency management personnel.
Alpha Institution held several active shooter exercises in 2013 and 2014. The after action
reports reflected overall consistent guidance from HSEEP on exercise documentation. As of
May 2016, Bravo Institution had conducted one active shooter exercise in the last three years.
The after action report reflected overall consistent guidance from HSEEP on exercise
documentation and different types of exercises.
Observations. A three hour campus safety exercise was observed at Bravo Institution.
The campus emergency exercise for a large scale medical scenario appeared to be utilizing
federal exercise guidance.
Interviews. Tables 5-8 outline the interview questions designed to answer Research
Question (a). Following each table is a brief description of the pertinent data themes.
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Table 5
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #1: Does your institution have a regular
program for conducting campus preparedness exercises in accordance with the federal agency
guidance (links to research question [a])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

University 101 on campus preparedness
Student noncompliance with campus
procedures from emergency phone
messages

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Alpha
Alpha

Reinforce faculty obligations in
classroom active shooter incident

Alpha

Chancellor’s Council on Safety and
Security

Alpha

Need interest of the department chair in
active shooter training
Faculty focused on research only

Alpha
Alpha

Advanced active shooter training every
couple of years for senior
administrators

Alpha

Multi-faceted approach, orientation,
individual training
I know they happen

Vested
Interest

Alpha
Bravo

The data from Alpha Institution showed a strong level of knowledge regarding exercise
guidance from the campus security plan. Due to the low number of available administrator or
faculty interviewees at Bravo Institution, no cross case synthesis was available. Several
statements strongly stated the lack of focus on campus security, along with increasing overall
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IHE requirements, was a major hindrance. Interviewee A9 commented: “The difficulty becomes
that we’re asked to participate in so many trainings, meetings, and committees. Some of these
things just get lost in the mass, regardless of their importance” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016).
Recommendations included federal support for improved security preparedness, as well
as a having a multifaceted approach to campus preparedness training that includes student and
faculty orientation on campus preparedness. A best practice noted was the use of a Chancellor’s
Council on Safety and Security which reviews campus TVI after action reports, determines
priorities based on risk, and makes recommendations for potential funding to senior
administrators. Department Chairs are a critical link to creating vested interest of faculty in
campus security preparedness.
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Table 6
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #1: How does your institution
conduct faculty and administrative staff training on the security plan (links to research question
[a])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Faculty and staff orientation

Alpha

Human Resources Act required basic
emergency training employees

Alpha

Faculty not subject requirements Human Alpha
Resources Act
Key decision makers Chancellor, Vice
Chancellor, one on one training

Alpha

Administrative building playbooks
initiated

Bravo

Active shooter website use tracker

Bravo

Significant staff obligations with
growing requirements

Bravo

Infrequent involvement in student
orientation

Bravo

Development of online training new
employees

Bravo

A significant hindrance to security preparedness at IHEs was the growing staff
obligations. One recommendation was made to require IHE active shooter training for students
as a prerequisite to register for courses. Best practices centered on including campus security
preparedness training at faculty and student orientations, and extending the requirements for the
Human Resources Act to faculty. No vested interest items were recommended. Data from both
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Alpha and Bravo cross case synthesis showed a lack of requirements on faculty and students for
security preparedness training was a significant hindrance.

Table 7
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #2: How does your institution
involve multiple partners (local emergency management, local responders) in the security
planning process (links to research question [a])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Local partners exercise evaluators and
controllers

Alpha

Local partner memorandum of
understanding joint training

Alpha

Local partner Jurisdictional Agreements

Alpha

Local Partner Mutual Aid Agreements

Alpha

Strong liaison with local emergency
management

Bravo

Local partner exercise involvement

Bravo

Local partner mutual aid agreements

Bravo

Strong relationship local fire department

Bravo

Joint training local responders

Bravo

Senior EM leadership quarterly meeting
with Homeland Security

Bravo

Local partners sent exercise information

Bravo

Hindrances, recommendations, and vested interest themes were not identified for this
interview question. However, numerous best practices were noted for integrating exercise plans
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which centered on joint training and partnering with local, state, and federal counterparts that
work with individual IHEs. Interviewee A7 stated, “All of this includes partners, and our
partners are University of [nearby Bravo School], Amtrak, [subway system in large city where
Bravo School is located], OEM Office of Emergency Management, and Fire Administration”
(A7 Interview, March 15, 2016). A cross case synthesis revealed overall very strong
relationships with local partners on many levels was a key best practice at both institutions.

Table 8
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #3: Does your institution have a
regular program for conducting campus preparedness exercises (links to research question [a])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Three year exercise plan that follows
HSEEP guidance
Exercise types and complexity limited
by funds and staff availability

Alpha
Alpha

Dedicated emergency response position
Establish short and long range goals for
drills and exercises

Best
Practice

Bravo
Bravo

Teaching active shooter fundamentals:
run, hide, fight

Bravo

Update of building playbook usually is
followed by exercise

Bravo

Train staff to update security plan

Bravo

Train staff and faculty on plan updates
before the exercise occurs

Bravo

Multiple days and times for training
anticipating pushback and conflicts

Bravo

Vested
Interest
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Funding was the biggest hindrance cited in preventing the development of functional and
full scale TVI exercises. The most significant recommendation was to educate administrative
representatives and other staff on updates to the campus security plan. Interviewee A16 stated,
One of the things that we’ve missed in the past, I think is, that I am now really pushing,
prior to my turn here, they would develop these plans and just go to the drill. I have a
concern that you develop these plans that you’ve got to train that staff as to what did you
change in the drill and you know between the original plan usually and an upgraded plan,
in particular, a lot of the people are not the same people. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016)
Another excellent recommendation from Interviewee A16 was making security preparedness
available to fit multiple IHE stakeholder schedules.
I try to say to them “What is so important in your job, if you know two weeks from now
that you have to be at training for an hour, can’t you figure out some way to get whatever
the deadline is for that Monday done Friday or done by 9:00 Monday so you can be at
training and we’ll only keep you for an hour.” We’re trying to really work with people
and work with their schedules, but there’s always that resistance. (A16 Interview, June
27, 2016)
No significant cross synthesis was noted between the two institutions.
Research Question (a) summary. Triangulation of the three data types showed that
both institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise guidance overall in developing
different types of exercises for the campus security plan. The HSEEP program, which is run by
FEMA, was found in site documentation for both institutions, observations for institution Bravo,
and during multiple interviews. Significant cross case synthesis was shown during triangulation
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of the data for the four themes of exercise hindrances, recommendation, best practices, and
vested interests.
The primary hindrance to fully implementing exercise guidance from FEMA is the
overall lack of funding to support the preparedness cycle of four exercise types. Most exercises
at both institutions were either workshop/seminars or table top exercises. These exercises are the
simplest exercise types and least expensive to design. These exercises tend to require a limited
amount of stakeholders, have simple objectives, and are not multifaceted with linking internal
and external partners. The limited amount of functional and full scale exercises for campus TVI
does not allow for the full benefit of the exercise preparedness cycle to design, exercise, develop
lessons learned, and update the security plan in a systematic process. The lack of funding and
limited staff dedicated to planning and exercises (e.g., a myriad of all hazards plans from point of
distribution exercise for a pandemic, extreme weather events, sporting events, and TVI events)
was the largest hindrance to completely meeting federal exercised guidance.
Second, numerous recommendations were triangulated between the three data collection
methods for both institutions. The recommendation for the establishment of a long term exercise
plan was supported by senior higher education administrators, staff, and faculty. It was
recommended that senior administrators, faculty, staff, and students participate in exercises to
the maximum extent possible. This is even more important with the large turnover of students
and faculty changes within many IHEs across the country.
A significant best practice triangulated from the data was the importance of integrating
the campus security plan and exercises with other stakeholders that may impact the IHE. State
and local emergency management representatives, including police, fire, and medical response
units, should be part of campus security exercise design teams, exercise participants, and
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observers. Vested interest in campus exercises must stem from a multifaceted approach through
security plan training activities before, during, and after exercises. IHE security planning
partners who develop individual building playbooks must be engaged in the entire exercise
campus security plan annually.
Research Question (b) Results
Research Question (b). How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for
overall preparedness to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student
injuries and loss of life?
Site documentation review. Exercises at Alpha Institution are in accordance with the
exercise schedule prepared annually by the institution’s Emergency Manager. Bravo Institution
holds periodic TVI exercises and exercise corrective actions for administrative updates of the
security plan are coordinated by campus emergency management representatives. Preparedness
training activities at the Alpha Institution are measured by attendance at TVI trainings, activity in
various campus preparedness communication platforms, and availability of campus preparedness
information to students on the institution’s website. TVI training requests at Bravo Institution
tend to be very high following a TVI at another IHE, otherwise, attendance at regularly
scheduled trainings is low. Preparedness training activities at the Bravo Institution were not
specifically set with metrics to track effectiveness.
According to the exercise after action reports, the active shooter exercises held by Alpha
Institution in 2013 and 2014 were measured at several key areas within the institutional security
plan, including the Emergency Operations Center, the Incident Command Post, and activities of
the Crisis Decision Team (CDT). The most recent active shooter exercise held at Bravo
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Institution was measured at several key areas in the institutional security plan, including a large
campus building. Multiple campus partners were invited and participated in the exercise.
Observations. Bravo Institution measured its exercise I observed in 2016 based on the
pre-training given to participants and their ability to follow the plan as directed by exercise
handouts provided for all participants. The objectives of the exercise were covered before it
began. The functional exercise included students, staff, and faculty. The exercise was measured
by how the exercise players carried out the required duties and responsibilities as laid out in the
contingency plan.
Interviews. Tables 9-12 illustrate the responses to interview questions designed to
answer Research Question (b). A description of the significant themes follows, along with
meaningful quotes from some of the interviewees.

Table 9
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #2: What is your role on campus
regarding an active shooter incident and the institution security plan (links to research question
[b])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept
Dependence on emergency management
for instructions during TVI

Hindrance

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Alpha

All Hazards Plan, and that Safety
Council
Dependence on police for instructions
during TVI

Recommendation

Alpha
Bravo
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Measurement questions of campus security exercises showed a hindrance for lack of
knowledge by some interviewees from administration and faculty at Alpha Institution.
Interviewee A9 stated: “I have no idea. That’s never even been discussed with me. I make the
assumption just like any disaster preparedness thing that I would receive an email that would
provide instructions for what I need or a text message” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016). No
recommendations were noted for this question. However, an administrator/faculty member at
Alpha Institution, Interviewee A14, was very knowledgeable about their All Hazards Plan and
Safety Council, both listed as best practices. This individual commented, “That Committee has a
range of different people on it and it’s the right people to have at the table” (A14 Interview, May
17, 2016). No vested interest items were coded. Due to the low number of available
administrator/faculty interviewees at Bravo Institution, no cross case synthesis was warranted.

Table 10
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #3: Have you ever participated in an
active shooter exercise or training (links to research question [b])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Host National ALERRT training for
active shooter

Alpha

Have police department rep qualified as
National ALERRT Trainer

Alpha
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No themes for hindrance, recommendations, or vested interested came from this
interview question. A significant best practice identified among multiple interviews at Alpha
Institution was having national Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
(ALERRT) for certain staff and even sending a relevant staff member to be trained to teach this
system to others back at the institution. No cross case synthesis was possible given the lack of
data from Bravo Institution for this interview question.

Table 11
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #4: How does your institution
measure the effectiveness of security plan exercises (links to research question [b])?

Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Subject matter experts as observers from
local partner agencies

Alpha

Percentage of campus personnel signed
up for alert warning system

Alpha

Voluntary opt in alert warning system

Alpha

Enterprise Risk Management
Committee evaluates exercise After
Action Reports

Bravo

Exercise Hot Wash

Bravo

Exercise standard evaluation parameters

Alpha

A major hindrance identified by this interview question was Alpha Institution’s voluntary
policy for IHE staff, faculty, and students to opt in to the emergency notification system.
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Despite this, a large number of campus personnel have opted in to the system. No
recommendations or vested interest codes were identified. Using subject matter experts from
local agencies as observers was identified as a best practice as it fosters those relationships and
allows for plan knowledge growth. Interviewee A11 stated: “Your standard evaluation observer
comments, and review and self-evaluations, and we use subject matter experts as our evaluators,
offsite and onsite” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016). Cross case synthesis showed the importance
of completion of exercise after action reports or having an exercise hot wash, which is a short
review post exercise, at both institutions.

Table 12
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #6: How is ICS incorporated in the
security planning process and what are any best practices (links to research question [b])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Number of individuals who sign up for
the alert notification system

Vested
Interest
Alpha

Measurement is done by number of
risks identified at the end of an exercise

Bravo

Utilization of the Risk Management
Committee

Bravo

Review of risks and potential actions by
Risk Management Committee

Bravo

Hot wash

Bravo

Items generated during a hot wash meeting after the exercise is a primary method of
measuring exercise effectiveness. Additionally, the use of evaluators who are experts in the field
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of campus security from other institutions or who are local stakeholders who know the campus
security plan can help gauge the effectiveness of exercise participants.
Research Question (b) summary.

The triangulation of data regarding how IHE

campus security plans are measured to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident focused
on feedback from exercise evaluators, observers, and hot wash items developed from participants
after the exercise. Participation from administrators, faculty, staff, and students is another
method used to measure overall preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident.
Participation includes attendance metrics at preparedness training sessions in person and online,
willingness to volunteer to participate in exercises, feedback given after an exercise during a hot
wash, and overall willingness to implement exercise after action recommended items.
The greatest hindrance triangulated from the data was the overall high levels of apathy
from campus stakeholders. For a short time, following a TVI event in another location,
participation in various security preparedness activities increased; however, not long afterwards
complacency and apathy set in. It was recommended that measurement methods of campus
security preparedness be routinely briefed to senior administrators. Senior IHE administrators
must ensure faculty and staff are aware of the negative consequences of being unprepared for a
TVI regarding loss of life and significant recovery challenges (e.g., Department of Education
enforcement penalties, lawsuits) for the IHE.
A best practice to measure campus security plan preparedness is to create institutional
groups with key stakeholders to champion preparedness planning, exercises, and training. For
instance, an All Hazards Plan and a Safety Council is utilized at Alpha Institution and an
Enterprise Risk Management Committee is used at Bravo Institution. Security plan preparedness
can be enhanced by administrators, faculty, and staff who receive training in national security
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preparedness. A highly regarded national training program is the Advanced Law Enforcement
Rapid Response Training (ALERRT). Vested interest measurement indicators of campus
preparedness should center on interest from senior campus administrators and senior faculty
(e.g., deans, department chairs) by participating in exercises. These stakeholders then actively
engage to develop solutions to complicated exercise after action report items.
Research Question (c) Results
Research Question (c). How are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on
exercises or updates to a campus security plan?
Site documentation review. Alpha Institution’s base Emergency Operation Plan (EOP)
has numerous hazard specifics including hurricane, winter weather, tornadoes, severe
thunderstorms, flood, active shooter, and several other contingencies. Exercises are scheduled
according to the multi-year training schedule and the institution had several active shooter
exercises in the last three years. Lessons learned from previous exercises at Alpha Institution in
the last three years were documented in the after action report improvement plan matrix. Certain
action items had not been addressed to date and most of those included some type of funding to
implement that specific action. Campus emergency management representatives from Bravo
Institution forward after action requirements for additional resource corrective measures to
institutional leadership for review, prioritization, and potential funding.
At Alpha Institution, lessons learned from previous preparedness training activities
supporting the campus security plan are incorporated in future activities. For example, campus
police training for active shooter incidents within campus buildings can be very disruptive during
the day. As a result, campus police on the night shift conduct preparedness training activities,
utilizing paint ball guns and various scenarios, throughout the campus buildings. At Bravo
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Institution, lessons learned from previous preparedness training activities supporting the campus
security plan are incorporated into future activities.
During my interview with a campus police representative at Alpha Institution, we
discussed the active shooter after action report. The campus police department had made most of
the recommended changes pertaining to campus police for active shooter policies and
procedures. Bravo Institution’s post active shooter exercise after action report activities included
comprehensive evaluation of the institution’s security plan, utilization of the HSEEP Exercise
Evaluation Guides (EEGs), and exercise hot wash with players, controllers, and evaluators.
Observations. A meeting was held at Bravo Institution after the exercise I observed to
gather lessons learned. The exercise design team and participants demonstrated excellent
engagement in the hot wash to identify numerous problems and potential solutions to update the
campus plan on that specific contingency. Some of the lessons learned pointed out by
participants showed a lack of knowledge of the contingency plan being exercised and individual
specific job aid requirements. The exercise director specifically showed interest in all of the
feedback received and made participants feel part of the plan improvement process. Additional
after action report items sent by the observer were taken with great interest and appreciation.
Interviews. Tables 13-17 depict the significant themes derived from interview questions
designed to answer Research Question (c).
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Table 13
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #4: What are best practices you have
observed from campus active shooter training or exercises (links to research question [c])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Passive mode

Alpha

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Multifaceted

Alpha

Prioritizing from the top down

Alpha

Virtual messaging

Alpha

Comprehensive security campaign:
messaging and posters, could be
everything from pedestrian safety,
personal safety, active shooter

Alpha

Looping videos through the campus
network of monitors

Alpha

Videos annual student leadership
conference

Alpha

Using ICS

Alpha

Communication across disciplines

Alpha

Multiple agency use of 800 Megahertz
communication system

Alpha

It’s important to be able to evaluate
proper actions in an active shooter
incident

Bravo

Key into first responder actions

Bravo
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One significant hindrance noted was that IHEs take a passive role in learning from
exercise lessons learned. Interviewee A14 noted:
In 2004 when there were two murders here, we stood up the Care Office and we did all
these things because it was necessary. You can easily fall into a reactive versus a
proactive mode when it comes to all of this stuff. Which is a long way to say, right now
it’s not that we’ve forgotten about active shooter. We’ve maybe once in the last 10 years
here had what I would refer to something close to an active shooter scenario and that was
a robber from Kmart who was running leisurely through campus while armed. (A14
Interview, May 17, 2016)
This same interviewee recommended having a comprehensive security awareness campaign with
multiple messaging options:
It’s got to be multi-faceted. Any of those things would and could work, right?
Prioritizing from the top down. We hit upon this with faculty at new faculty training.
Because we’re only less than 50% residential now, you can hit the students in the dorms
but then you’re only getting roughly 32% of your undergraduates so what are you doing
for the other 68% in the way of pushing messages to them virtually as they’re in their
places off campus? (A14 Interview, May 17, 2016)
Communication among Alpha Institution’s entities and partners was a critical best practice.
Interviewee A8 stated:
That way partner units that come in to help you. Everybody’s working on the same page.
Everybody’s going by the same guidelines. Everybody knows what their role is based on
their titles given. So running NIMS is really important. Luckily here in the county, we
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can get on with everybody: Fire, EMS, all the local agencies. Interagency working
relationships. (A8 Interview, May 16, 2016)
No significant cross case synthesis was possible given the lack of information for this interview
question from Bravo Institution.
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Table 14
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #5: What do you recommend to motivate
students, staff, or faculty to be more invested in active shooter preparedness (links to research
question [c])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Early student education

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Alpha

Active shooter training by experts
Voluntary opt in notification systems
have gaps for faculty, staff, etc.
Comprehensive security plan education
new faculty

Alpha
Alpha
Alpha

Smart classroom emergency
communications

Alpha

Active shooter training for community,
open to anyone

Alpha

Twice a month active shooter training
at the police station

Alpha

Police help security plan development

Alpha

Monthly digital magazine training
announcements not effective for
participation
Role assignment for active shooter
preparedness instills investment in
safety

Vested
Interest

Alpha

Bravo

As noted in a previous interview question, a hindrance to preparedness is the voluntary
opt in emergency notification system for faculty, staff, and students at Alpha Institution. Smart
classrooms were noted as a best practice that allows IHE faculty and staff direct communications
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in emergency situations. A significant recommendation was building upon the students’ active
shooter training they likely received at high schools and before. A strong best practice was
inviting community stakeholders and the general public in for active shooter training.
Additionally, searching out experts, if not already present on campus, to make presentations on
campus security was a best practice. Interviewee A9 commented:
Again, I think getting them while they’re freshman, while they’re more receptive to
receiving that information would be critical. And receiving it from someone other than a
faculty member, perhaps someone who is a police officer. I don’t think students would
take it seriously if a faculty member with expertise in Biochemistry is trying to explain to
them how to react to an active shooter or other forms of emergency preparedness. (A9
Interview, May 16, 2016)
No cross case synthesis was available from the data.

117
Table 15
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #6: Do you have any recommended best
practices for campus security preparedness (links to research question [c])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

New school year faculty training

Alpha

Active shooter training included in
faculty retreats

Alpha

Experts give active shooter training

Alpha

Training by major each year rather than
every course is more efficient

Alpha

Online training

Alpha

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Active Shooter Training at Annual
Safety Symposium

Alpha

Symposium varying formats from guest
speaker to conference style

Alpha

Writing something down

Bravo

Make plan very accessible

Bravo

No hindrance or vested theory coding was noted. The most significant recommendation
for lessons learned was finding innovative ways to give active shooter training at other faculty
trainings, retreats, and annual safety symposiums, plus providing incentives for voluntary
attendance. Interviewee A10 noted: “That’s where it becomes an issue. How do you get them to
do it? Do you give them a little carrot? By doing this you get a free coupon to go the donut shop
or whatever or a coffee. Which possibly would make sure that they all do it” (A10 Interview,
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May 16, 2016). Due to paucity of information from Bravo Institution for this interview question,
no cross synthesis was possible.

Table 16
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #5: How does your institution
incorporate after action report lessons learned into updates to the campus security plan (links to
research question [a])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Matrix tracking

Alpha

Assign responsibility for action items

Alpha

Current US culture has short attention
span and moves on to the next thing

Alpha

Review After Action Reports

Bravo

Update policies and procedures

Bravo

Exchange information between
departments

Bravo

Implementation of real world incidents
lessons learned

Bravo

Note. This question was moved from Research Question (a) to Research Question (c).

The short attention span pervasive in our culture is a hindrance, therefore, more
accountability tools must be developed to ensure campus preparedness activities are executed at
all IHEs. No recommendations or vested interest items were noted. Following the exercise
lessons learned is a best practice. Interviewee A11 commented:
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We review the After Action notes and come up with the After Action improvement
planning from the AR and identify those points that are in the improvement plan to
incorporate into the next cycle of planning. Then we review, train, and exercise again to
see if improvements have been made. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)
Cross case synthesis showed the tracking of exercise lessons learned by assigning responsibility
and by using exercise evaluation standards to real world events is a significant best practice.
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Table 17
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #6: How is ICS incorporated in the
security planning process and what are any best practices (links to research questions [a-c])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

ICS fully implemented

Alpha

Crisis management under University
Police

Alpha

Consequence management post active
shooter incident under other divisions

Alpha

Senior management have more
difficulty with ICS than first responders

Alpha

ICS is sometimes a square peg in a
round hole

Bravo

Participation or join University and
College Caucus of the International
Association of Emergency Managers
Crisis Management Team engagement
with Incident Commander issues

Bravo

Bravo

More hands on training

Bravo

Providing examples of how things can
happen at the institution

Bravo

Basic ICS training for the President and
the President’s Cabinet

Bravo

A hindrance pointed out by Interviewee A11 at Alpha Institution was that the national
ICS framework is not always aligned with some state Emergency Support Functions
frameworks:
Tactics such as response tactics, is governed through ICS, our emergency operations
center is through ESF (Emergency Support Functions) and we use 16 ESFs that do not
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mash up necessarily with FEMA’s ESFs and the detail on that is in the EOP (Emergency
Operation Plan). (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)
A good recommendation for emergency managers to become more connected to their
field was to join the University and College Caucus of the International Association of
Emergency Managers. Numerous best practices were noted, with a significant one being the use
of ICS response in lessons learned, as explained by Interviewee A16:
We actually use ICS in the model as a setup for every department as they set up their
playbook, whether it be engineering and all their research. We try to get them to follow
that whole model of identifying an Incident Commander, making sure you have planning,
you have logistics. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016)
Based on the complexity of decisions they will need to apply and discuss, Interviewee A16 made
another outstanding recommendation to not rely solely on online training for senior IHE
administrators. A16 recommended:
I don’t believe that you can do the initial online. I think that you need to talk about. You
need to give simple drills when you do it. Just from experience, I myself felt that just
going online isn’t always the best way to do these sorts of things and for busy people I
don’t think online they’re going to pay attention. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016)
Cross case synthesis revealed a major hindrance to campus security preparedness (i.e.,
via implementation of exercise lessons learned and planned updates) was a large knowledge gap
among responders and IHE senior management.
Research Question (c) summary. Triangulation of the data revealed that both
institutions collect and draft exercise after action reports. The implementation of exercise after
action report action items were dependent on several factors and varied between the institutions.
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These factors include the cost to implement the exercise lesson learned item, the feedback
emergency management staff receive from institutional stakeholders on exercise after action
reports, and the willingness of senior administrators, deans, and department chairs to discuss
exercise after action report data, brain storm solutions and updates to the security plan, and
support new requirements within the security plan.
Data analysis indicates that the greatest hindrance across multiple data collection
methods was the lack of funding to implement lesson learned recommendations and to update the
campus security plan. The lack of funding for campus security after action items was directly
linked to a general level of apathy for involvement in campus preparedness activities from some
administrators, faculty, staff, and students. It was recommended that senior administrators
receive more campus security plan training. Incentive programs for participation in campus
security exercises from IHE stakeholders could help increase awareness and commit to updating
campus security plans.
Best practices in implementing exercise lessons learned included using a matrix to track
exercise lessons learned, assigning responsibility for each action item, and conducting a periodic
review of action items to ensure accountability for follow-up, whether the administration decides
to implement or not to implement an item. Vested interest items were extremely limited for this
research question.
Research Question (d) Results
Research Question (d). How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and
administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus
preparedness?
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Site documentation review. As mentioned above, Alpha Institution has had one active
shooter exercise in the last three years to help get the campus community more invested in
active shooter preparedness. Bravo Institution also has had one active shooter exercise in the
last three years
Lessons learned from exercises at Alpha Institution are incorporated into other
preparedness training activities. Attitudes of the campus police and emergency management
staff are very focused on active shooter preparedness. Alpha Institution conducted an overview
of campus safety following the TVI at Virginia Tech in 2007. It was noted that the institution is
not immune to a TVI like that one. Alpha Institution will continue to develop a more
comprehensive approach to student safety. The current chancellor is committed to increasing
both the number and variety of emergency drill scenarios in which campus administrators
practice institutional emergency response protocols.
At Bravo Institution, lessons learned from exercises are incorporated into other
preparedness training activities including active shooter training and outreach. Attitudes of
Bravo Institution campus police and emergency management staff are also quite focused on
active shooter preparedness. Given Bravo Institution’s location in a large metropolitan area, the
institution also has numerous TVI possibilities, which the campus incorporates into preparedness
activities.
Alpha Institution’s active shooter after action report provides lessons learned to help
focus faculty, staff, and administrators invest in overall campus preparedness. From the active
shooter exercise, a spreadsheet appendix was created for a campus improvement plan broken
down by capability, observation title, areas of improvement, implementation recommendation,
primary responsible department, start date, completion date, and budget. As of May 2016, the
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campus active shooter exercise improvement plan had not been updated since November 2014
and none of the 30 plus items requested had been funded per discussion with emergency
management personnel at Alpha Institution. Bravo Institution’s after action report for its most
recent active shooter exercise also provides lessons learned to help focus faculty, staff, and
administrators investing in overall campus preparedness.
Observations. The exercise director’s and controllers’ attitudes and behaviors were
extremely positive and engaging during the exercise pre-brief, actual exercise, and post exercise
hot wash. This enthusiasm was critical to get volunteers, many of whom did not volunteer for
the role to which the contingency plan exercise had them assigned, to gain interest in the
exercise. Besides being positive and engaging, the leadership shown by the exercise director
gave participants who had minimal knowledge of exercise duties and responsibilities the
confidence to ask questions, learn, and become more proficient.
Interviews. Tables 18-20 contain important themes found from the interview questions
designed to answer Research Question (d).
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Table 18
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #7: How can the attitudes and behaviors
of administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus
preparedness (links to research question [d])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Have to have a plan

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Alpha

People only want training after a TVI

Alpha

Quarterly staff meeting discussion on
active shooter

Alpha

Assigning individual building security
preparedness liaison as collateral duty

Alpha

Need focus from leadership

Alpha

Progressive security preparedness
training at multiple administrative
positions

Alpha

Progressive security preparedness
training at Department Chair, Dean, etc.

Alpha

Numerous new senior administrative
positions unfamiliar with security plan

Alpha

Comprehensive Safety Survey

Alpha

Survey focused on IHE attitudes and
behaviors

Alpha

Indecision on potentially scaring IHE
community

Vested
Interest

Bravo

A hindrance to IHE stakeholder attitudes is the changeover of new personnel without
interest in or mandatory training on campus security preparedness. Furthermore, requests for
training or attendance at trainings spike after a TVI event at another IHE. Interviewee A8 noted:
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“They only want to talk about active shooter when it happens, when it’s the news article, but in
between news articles it goes away” (A8 Interview, May 16, 2016). Interviewee A9 added, “I
can’t imagine a time where I’ve heard, I could be wrong, any of our administrators from the
Chancellor on down has ever talked about disaster preparedness” (A9 Interview, May 16, 2016).
A noteworthy recommendation was assigning a building security preparedness liaison as
collateral duty within each IHE building to be responsible for developing building security
playbooks. These individual building playbooks would periodically be exercised. One of the
most important best practices mentioned was the establishment of progressive security
preparedness training at multiple administrative positions. Interviewee A10 recommended:
When a professor goes from being a professor to say department chair to dean for
example … usually when they have a dean they have a look, now I’m administration now
I’m going to move up to be a provost, you know that’s kind of the ladder, usually up to
maybe the president of the university or chancellor. I do know that there are workshops
those people go to. I don’t know what they are exactly, but they are how to be a dean
workshop. At that workshop it would be very important that something like this should
be covered too at whatever level as you move up through administration. (A10 Interview,
May 16, 2016)
No vested interest items were coded. No significant synthesis between the two cases, all valid
points.
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Table 19
Responses to Emergency Managers/Police Interview Question #7: What would you recommend
to motivate administrators to be more interested in security preparedness (links to research
question [d])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept
Improving preparedness culture

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Vested
Interest

Alpha

President or Chancellor stating importance
of security preparedness in speeches,
training, etc.

Alpha

Constant education

Alpha

Potential loss of income examples

Bravo

Practical examples are best motivators

Bravo

Incentives for exercise volunteers

Bravo

Little to no budget for emergency
preparedness, active shooter, etc.

Bravo

Establish requirements for faculty to review
active shooter procedures with students at
start of semester

Bravo

First lecture of the year each professor
reviews active shooter preparedness 30
minutes

Bravo

Faculty are the gatekeepers for students

Bravo

Personal relationships

Bravo

Find faculty and staff with previous
backgrounds in emergency preparedness
(e.g., Boy Scouts, Volunteer Firefighter)

Bravo

Support education courses

Bravo

One on one training

Bravo

Prepare relevant, local, and engaging
scenarios for active shooter training

Bravo
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Having little to no specific budgets to support campus security preparedness is a
remarkable hindrance. This lack of financial support leads to apathy. Interviewee A11 reported,
“You’ve got to get rid of the apathy. You’ve got to make it a priority for them. To do that, they
have to relate it to their own lives and own experiences” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016).
Another hindrance is that the preparedness culture is relegated to the professionals (i.e., police
and emergency managers). Faculty, staff, and administrators are focused on their primary roles
in academics and other elements of the institution, and rely on others to take care of the security
issues; however, it is each person’s responsibility to be prepared. This culture is due to lack of
accountability for students, faculty, and administrators to be exposed to campus preparedness
planning, training, engagement, and outreach. Interviewee A15 added:
They’ll say, “Oh, we’ve got to plan and we’ve got to do this” then our memory shorts or
goes away after a fashion until another one happens. They’re focused on Academics.
They’re focused on enrollment. They’re focused on getting the University further down
the path. (A15 Interview, June 14, 2016)
An interviewee recommended the faculty should be required to train students at the
beginning of the semester. A best practice is the inclusion of faculty in preparedness when
possible, as they are the gatekeepers to students. Vested interest falls with the leader of the
institution and is key to success. Interviewee A13 noted:
I hate to fall back on education, to build that culture … One it’s going to take a senior
management commitment to say “this is what we’re about and to pay attention to it” so
one, it has to be an edict from above. (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016)
One of the best ways to get vested interest in campus preparedness is to do the research
and find examples that hit home. For instance, Interviewee A7 described an incident on campus
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involving a prolonged power outage in a research building, which resulted in the loss of multiple
experiments due to inadequate cooling: “After the lost research grants for $4 million that was
not renewed because of the loss of research materials, I didn’t have to motivate them. They
motivate me” (A7 Interview, March 15, 2016).
Cross case synthesis showed consistent engagement with multiple campus stakeholders
can improve the attitudes of the IHE community. This relationship between consistent
engagement and attitude is particularly evident among those who are interested in or who have a
previous links to preparedness (e.g., Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and volunteer fire fighters) through
training, symposiums, one on one discussions, and other outreach programs.
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Table 20
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #8: How can the attitudes and
behaviors of students, faculty, staff, and administrators consistently be focused on investing in
active shooter overall campus preparedness (links to research question [d])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Emphasize common sense and basic
training

Alpha

Reduction in faculty apathy for security
preparedness

Alpha

Engage with parents over summer
before students attend orientation

Alpha

Reduction in percentages of blissful
ignorance or apathy

Alpha

Student Affairs models the way for
safety to students

Alpha

Seek out guidance from Middle Eastern
countries with higher terrorism rates

Alpha

Active shooter training a priority for
faculty orientation

Alpha

Do not overdue training

Bravo

Active shooter preparedness movie
education

Bravo

Make training accountability linked to
student registration, Blackboard, etc.

Bravo

Engagement with Resident Advisor,
Resident Director, Counseling
Department

Bravo

Online training for different groups at
IHEs for active shooter

Bravo
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Opt out system alert warning is
vulnerability

Bravo

Campaign to improve opt out statistics,
quality of contact information

Bravo

Big events can showcase Emergency
Management system and benefits

Bravo

Executive level seminars to senior
management by experts

Bravo

The opportunity for faculty, staff, and students to opt out of the emergency notification
system or not supply their contact information or connecting with the HR system with
emergency notifications was a significant hindrance and vulnerability. Interviewee A16
described the outcry from faculty and staff that they were not notified of a threat on campus:
So we called IT. IT went into the system and found out that like 96% of the students
never opted out, some students did. But less than 50% of faculty and staff didn’t supply
their cell numbers. They on their own didn’t get it because they refused to supply. So we
did a campaign. (A16 Interview, June 27, 2016)
A notable recommendation within this interview question was the suggestion that U.S.
IHEs should look to international IHEs at high risk for violence (e.g., Israel) for lessons learned.
Another good recommendation was to increase the number of IHE staff, faculty, and students
interested in campus preparedness. Interviewee A13 commented:
Is it apathy or ignorance? They don’t know and they don’t care. I think it’s blissful
ignorance. “You know what, it’s not something I’m worried about.” I don’t want to say
all of them. There are a few that are very invested and committed. (A13 Interview, May
17, 2016)
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It should be noted many faculty do care, but most interviewees concurred faculty interest
and participation is minimal with regard to campus security. Communication engagement
through exercises, security plan development, and preparedness training must be multifaceted,
effective and properly marketed to administrators, faculty, staff, and students. Administrators,
faculty, staff and students must be willing to make campus security preparedness a priority.
Modeling the way was a significant best practice in campus security preparedness from leaders
across the campus. Interviewee A13 noted, “I think it comes from who they view as authority,
be it the staff, the faculty, the administrators, the Student Affairs staff in particular, that affect so
many of them, they need to model that this is important” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016).
Executive seminars for senior administrators and a series of training sessions over a
semester for new faculty or staff were discussed as an excellent tool towards investing in campus
security preparedness. Interviewee A13 stated:
What they’re discussing is rather than doing a two day cram session, they’re basically
going to require a semester long faculty and staff lunch orientation and what they will do
is they will meet like every other week or once every other week at lunch for a different
session. Instead of having a two day cram session at the beginning, you’ll have a one day
cram session but then every week once a week, every Thursday at lunch, let’s say, for a
semester, or even possibly a year, there will be a different topic. They want to
incorporate Emergency Preparedness and Safety into one of those. (A13 Interview, May
17, 2016)
No significant cross case synthesis was noted between either institutions for the four
themes.
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Research Question (d) summary. Having a robust exercise program which is in
complete alignment with the HSEEP recommended exercise cycles and plan updates was the
most significant finding regarding improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff,
and administrators on campus security preparedness. The next most important factor is
engagement of senior leadership in campus security planning and exercises for TVI events.
Campus security preparedness training for active shooter incidents, whether online or in person,
that use examples that students can connect with, prior incidents, and engaging instructors can
increase stakeholder investment in preparedness. Instructor or exercise directors must be
innovative to engage exercise participants and model the way on why security preparedness is
important on campus.
The greatest overall hindrance to faculty, staff, and administrators to focus on campus
preparedness is a lack of consistent and dedicated resource support. TVI exercises require the
investment of administrators, faculty, and staff to commit the resource time to develop exercise
scenarios, and attend exercise planning meetings. Administrators, faculty, and staff have to
commit the resource time to aiding in the development of an exercise after action report.
Resource time and potential funding must be allocated to correct exercise after action items.
Resource time must be given by administrators, faculty, and staff to attend training on new
security plan updates from each exercise to maintain a maximum level of security preparedness.
Given the relative infrequency of active shooter incidents at the thousands of IHEs across
the county, campus emergency management preparedness for TVIs can be an extreme challenge
with the myriad of campus priorities and government requirements. One of the most significant
recommendations to improve attitudes was to incorporate TVI preparedness training with an
overview of the campus security plan for all administrators, faculty, and staff annually before the

134
start of the new school year. New administrators, faculty, and staff should be required to attend a
more in-depth initial campus security preparedness orientation program. This training should not
be incorporated with 20 other topics for campus training crammed into a one or two day
program. One of the most powerful best practices found to increase attitudes on campus security
is to have a training program for administrators and senior faculty to increase their
responsibilities during an active shooter incident. The most significant vested interest action
from the data was conducting executive level training seminars for selected senior administrators
to ensure they are ready to execute the campus security plan during an incident.
Research Question (e) Results
Research Question (e). Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI
security oversight, established across the board requirements for campus security plans and
exercises, and targeted resource support improve campus preparedness?
Site documentation review. After a review of the campus security plans of both Alpha
Institution and Bravo Institution, it is my professional opinion that additional legislative
requirements for security plan updates and exercises would facilitate more security plan
investment by senior leadership, exercise lessons learned implementation, and increase federal
grant funding of security gaps. Both Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution have invested
millions of dollars in campus preparedness training and security initiatives since 2004,
including emergency call boxes, campus police preparedness, and improved campus
communication. Low attendance by faculty, staff, and students at campus preparedness
activities demonstrates a consistent lack of vested interest at both IHEs. New legislation and
increased federal funding to support additional personnel in campus police and emergency
management has the potential to increase TVI campus outreach and exercise support at both
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Alpha Institution and Bravo Institution. New legislation with associated funding could create
requirements to monitor institutional exercise after action reports, implementation of after
action report items, and prioritizing potential federal funding support.
Observations. No applicable data were gathered during observations for this research
question.
Interviews. Tables 21-23 contain the relevant themes associated with the interview
questions designed to answer Research Question (e).

Table 21
Responses to Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #8: Would new legislation that
centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight improve campus security plans and
exercises (links to research question [e])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Varying policies state to state

Alpha

State institution vs. private institution
requirements may differ

Alpha

Legislation could increase
accountability security preparedness
Fear new legislation requirements
would mean more unfunded mandates
Increased partnerships with FEMA,
DOE, etc.

Recommendation

Best
Practice

Vested
Interest

Alpha
Alpha
Bravo

Numerous hindrances were identified for developing new legislation, including the
potential increased burden of creating unfunded mandates. Interviewee A9 commented: “That’s
one of the difficulties with a lot of legislation is there are unfunded mandates where it says you
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need to do this, but by the way figure out a way to do it on your own dime” (A9 Interview, May
16, 2016).
Another hindrance mentioned was potential differences in implementation from state to
state and private versus public institutions. Despite the multitude of hindrances addressed, new
legislation was supported by most interviewees for increased accountability and resources for
campus security. A recommendation was the increased use of partnerships between FEMA and
the Department of Education so campus preparedness had a more focused outreach to IHEs. No
best practices or vested interest items were noted. No cross case synthesis was seen between
either institutions.
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Table 22
Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #9: Would new legislation that
centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight improve resource support improve
campus preparedness (links to research question [e])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

Effective legislation

Alpha

Move emergency response from DOE to
FEMA

Alpha

Example of Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Exercises run by FEMA

Alpha

Review of which agency emergency
response fits in the federal government

Alpha

Review how to integrate numerous DOE
requirements: Clery, Title IX

Alpha

Skepticism over new legislation

Best
Vested
Practice Interest

Alpha

So many requirements already has led to Alpha
significant confusion
Review accountability and enforcement
tools for the Department of Education
for campus security preparedness

Alpha

Increase funding for training

Bravo

Move emergency response requirements
out of DOE, it is not their expertise

Bravo

FEMA should manage IHE emergency
management funds and grants

Bravo

One hindrance to effective legislation is a lack of trust that any new requirements would
be funded or that funding would be taken away in the future. A recommendation was for the
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Department of Education to send Dear Colleague letters regarding campus preparedness and step
up enforcement polices of the existing limited requirements and cutting financial aid to
institutions that do not comply. No best practices or vested interest items were coded.
This interview question generated the most cross case synthesis. Cross case synthesis
showed both institutions recommend campus emergency management be moved out of the
Department of Education to FEMA or another more security plan and exercise centered agency.
Interviewees agreed across the board that the Department of Education lacks the expertise to give
guidance or hold agencies accountable to more requirements for campus security planning and
exercises. Interviewee A11 stated:
That’s kind of like having teachers tell an emergency manager what needs to be done.
They’re focusing on how to teach birds. People know what to do with birds. That
doesn’t necessarily transfer very well to teach about active shooters. You really need to
move Consequence Management and Emergency Planning underneath FEMA or DHS
and have an education liaison to be the oversight body for higher education emergency
management. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)
The same Interviewee, A11, also noted that FEMA is already providing a similar role for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “There’s a reason why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
does not manage off site Consequence Management. With the Radiological Emergency
Preparedness Program FEMA manages the offsite consequence of the REPP program and NRC
does on plant” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016). Another strong comment supporting this
recommendation was made by Interviewee A16: “They should stay with education. I think the
drills and exercises of emergency management belong under FEMA or Department of Homeland
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Security because that’s what they specialize in. I think education should stay with education”
(A16 Interview, June 27, 2016).
Both institutions made recommendations that any new funding should all be managed by
another federal agency other than the Department of Education. Interviewee A16 commented:
I think the funding should also come through FEMA so it’s focused into the drills and
response those types of education for the emergency responders who are coming in. I
think the Department of Education is branching a little too far out sometimes. I don’t
think that’s where their field of expertise should be, it should be in education. (A16
Interview, June 27, 2016)
No data were gathered for Administrator/Faculty Interview Question #9: Is there
anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to research
questions [a-e])? None of the interviewees had other comments to provide.
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Table 23

Responses to Emergency Manager/Police Interview Question #10: Is there anything else you
would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to research questions [a-e])?
Themes
Key Phrase/Concept

Hindrance

Recommendation

More outreach to student clubs and
organizations

Alpha

Active shooter are fast events,
readiness for proper actions is
important

Alpha

Second tier of required training for
students to carry weapons on campus

Alpha

Police officers show up on scene with
active shooter and shoot student or
staff with weapon (concealed carry
permit holder) who is engaging with
active shooter

Vested
Interest

Alpha

Holding a weapon and police show up,
throw the weapon away from you as
soon as possible

Alpha

Virginia Tech has record enrollment
in 2015
Emergency Management and
preparedness is at the end of a chain
for administrators

Best
Practice

Bravo
Bravo

A hindrance noted by one interviewee relates to the potential legislation to allow students
or staff to carry weapons on campus. If someone with a permit to carry a weapon engages an
active shooter, the police officers may shoot the wrong individual or both individuals in the
confusion. Interviewee A13 explained:
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“When I arrive on the scene with gun shots I’m probably going to shoot him.” That’s
what every police officer says, “When I get to the scene and there’s a civilian with a gun,
I have to assume he’s a bad guy…I have to assume he’s a bad guy and I’m taking him
out.” And that’s where they all get really confusing. Oh, give the students and faculty
members or the staff the right to carry firearms. Ok, fine. Even we have police officers
say it’s fine, but then they look at you and go, “If I flip on the scene and you got a .357 in
your hand and there’s some dead bodies on the ground, I’m just as likely to shoot you
right there and ask questions later.” (A13 Interview, May 16, 2016)
On the other hand, Interviewee A13 also reported hearing a recommendation in creating
advanced training requirements for individuals in states and on campuses where concealed carry
is permitted:
I had a police officer tell me this past week, “I think if you step up to a higher level,” this
is an ex-Marine, 15 year veteran of the police force said “I support concealed carry on
campus.” Without me asking he said “I support it, readily encourage it if there is a second
tier of training.” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016)
Legislation in support of increased requirements could be hindered by many IHEs and
other influential congressional groups that have not had a TVI incident on campus. Interviewee
A11 stated, “Craig Fugate had a really good quote that he used during the cybersecurity hearing
with Congress a couple of weeks ago. He said ‘We tend to prepare for what we’ve experienced,
not what is possible’” (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016). Interviewee A11 also recommended
proper training for first responders given the very fast nature of active shooter events:
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If you look at all the active shooter cases, they are over in five minutes. From the time
the first shots are fired to the time the assailant is dead is five minutes. It was like four
minutes and 19 seconds at Virginia Tech. (A11 Interview, May 16, 2016)
More outreach to student clubs was also recommended. Nothing significant was revealed from
cross case synthesis of the two institutions.
Research Question (e) summary. Triangulation of the data indicates new legislation
that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight, aligned exercise requirements with
HSEEP, and increased resource support would improve campus security preparedness. The
principal hindrance to new legislation for campus preparedness is the suspicion that government
would implement these through unfunded mandates. Already, there are numerous requirements
to report to the Department of Education for student safety and security. It was the general belief
that further requirements or changes to existing ones would further complicate the morass of
regulatory framework. Furthermore, transferring oversight of campus security exercises and
plans from the Department of Education to FEMA or another agency was widely supported. In
this framework, similar to what FEMA does for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IHEs
would have the federal government exercise experts providing guidance, mentoring, and holding
IHEs accountable, in conjunction with existing Department of Education requirements linking
student safety with federal loan support. Another recommendation was requiring advanced
training on police protocols and first responder priorities for students, faculty, or staff who are
allowed to carry weapons on campus.
Summary
The goals of this qualitative collective case study were to discover barriers to IHEs’
security preparedness for TVI events with a focus on active shooter incidents and to make
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recommendations for improvement. Qualitative data collected for this study were in the form of
site documentation reviews, observation of an exercise, and interviews with campus personnel.
The data from the interviews were analyzed with a qualitative data software package, from
which I identified four themes: hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested
interests. The three data types were triangulated and summarized for each of the five research
questions (a-e). The major barriers to security preparedness were lack of resource funding for
dedicated preparedness staff, security planning and exercises; apathy regarding campus security
preparedness by administrators, staff faculty and students; multiple federal security preparedness
guides; and the lack of requirements for robust security planning and exercises. Major
recommendations identified from the interviews include increased funding for security
preparedness training, planning, and exercises; IHE senior leadership must model the way; and
the transfer of IHE campus security preparedness oversight to FEMA. A more thorough
discussion of the findings follows in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Overview
The aim of this qualitative collective case study was to identify the barriers to campus
security preparedness and discover best practices of universities and colleges conducting security
preparedness activities for a TVI incident (TVI). Below I have summarized my triangulated
analysis for each of the five research questions designed to achieve this aim. Following that, I
discuss my findings in relation to the existing literature as reviewed in Chapter Two. Next I will
discuss the methodological and practical implications for this study, including a large list of
recommendations regarding oversight, funding, guidance, recommendations targeted to IHEs,
and recommendations regarding training. The limitations section lists several potential flaws in
the design of this study, followed finally by recommendations for future research.
Summary of Findings
Research Question (a)
Research Question (a): How do institutions integrate federal agency multiyear exercise
guidance of various types of exercises (workshop/seminar, tabletop, functional, and full scale)
for the campus security plan?
Triangulation of the three data types showed that both institutions integrate federal
agency multiyear exercise guidance in developing different types of exercises for the campus
security plan. The HSEEP program, which is run by FEMA, was found in site documentation
for both institutions, observations for Bravo Institution, and during multiple interviews.
The major hindrance to fully implementing the exercise guidance from FEMA is the
overall lack of funding to support the preparedness cycle. Numerous recommendations were
made, including the establishment of a long term exercise plan, and that senior administrators,
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faculty, staff, and students participate in exercises to the maximum extent possible. This is even
more important with the large turnover of students and faculty changes within many IHEs across
the country. A significant best practice observed was the integration of the campus security plan
with other stakeholders that may impact the IHE. Vested interest in campus exercises must stem
from a multifaceted approach through security plan training activities before, during, and after
exercises. IHE security planning partners who develop individual building playbooks must be
engaged in the entire exercise campus security plan annually.
Research Question (b)
Research Question (b): How are exercises of the campus security plan measured for
overall preparedness to respond to a large-scale active shooter incident with multiple student
injuries and loss of life?
The campus security plans to respond to a TVI are measured on feedback from exercise
evaluators, observers, and hot wash items developed from participants after the exercise.
Participation from administrators, faculty, staff, and students is another method used to measure
overall preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident. Participation includes attendance
metrics at preparedness training sessions in person and online, willingness to volunteer to
participate in exercises, feedback given after an exercise during a hot wash, and overall
willingness to implement exercise after action recommended items.
The greatest hindrance to preparedness was the overall high level of apathy from campus
stakeholders. Several participants of the interview process recommended that measurement
methods of campus security preparedness be routinely briefed to senior administrators. Senior
IHE administrators then must ensure faculty and staff are aware of the negative consequences of
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being unprepared for a TVI regarding loss of life and significant recovery challenges (e.g.,
Department of Education enforcement penalties, lawsuits) for the IHE.
A best practice to measure campus security plan preparedness is to consistently review
the plan by institutional groups with key stakeholders to champion preparedness planning,
exercises, and training. For instance, an All Hazards Plan and a Safety Council is in place at
Alpha Institution, while Bravo Institution utilizes an Enterprise Rick Management Committee.
These groups review exercise after action reports, determine priorities based on risk, and makes
recommendations for funding to senior leadership. Vested interest measurement indicators of
campus preparedness should center on participation of senior campus administrators and senior
faculty (e.g., deans, department chairs) in exercises. These stakeholders then actively engage to
develop solutions to complicated exercise after action report items.
Research Question (c)
Research Question (c): How are previous TVI exercise lessons used in follow-on
exercises or updates to a campus security plan?
While both institutions collect and draft exercise after action reports, the implementation
of exercise after action report action items were dependent on several factors and varied between
the institutions. These factors include the cost to implement the exercise lesson learned items;
the feedback emergency management staff receive from institutional stakeholders on exercise
after action reports; and the willingness of senior administrators, deans, and department chairs to
discuss exercise after action report data, brain storm solutions and updates to the security plan,
and support new requirements within the security plan.
The greatest hindrance to implementing lessons learned in exercises or updates to the
security plan was the lack of funding. This lack of funding was directly linked to a general level
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of apathy for involvement in campus preparedness activities from some administrators, faculty,
staff, and students. It was recommended that senior administrators receive more preparedness
training to enhance their knowledge base and to promote vested interest. Incentive programs for
participation in campus security exercises could help increase awareness and commit to updating
campus security plans.
Best practices in implementing exercise lessons learned included using a matrix to track
exercise lessons learned, assigning responsibility for each action item, and conducting a periodic
review of action items to ensure accountability for follow-up, whether the administration decides
to implement or not to implement an item. My previous leadership experience and the research
literature support the concept that engagement and interest from the president, chancellor, and
other senior administrators is critical to ensuring exercise lessons learned are implemented in the
campus security plan.
Research Question (d)
Research Question (d): How can the attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and
administrators consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus
preparedness?
Having a robust exercise program which is in complete alignment with the HSEEP
recommended exercise cycles and plan updates was the most significant finding regarding
improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff, and administrators on campus
security preparedness. The next most important factor is engagement of senior administrators,
(e.g., chancellors and presidents) in campus security planning oversight, support, and leadership.
Campus security preparedness training from engaging instructors using examples people can
connect with can increase stakeholder investment in preparedness.
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The greatest overall hindrance to faculty, staff, and administrators to focus on campus
preparedness is a lack of consistent and dedicated resource support. Resource time must be
afforded by administrators, faculty and staff for all to attend training to maintain a maximum
level of security preparedness.
Recommendations to improve attitudes towards preparedness include training for all new
administrators, faculty, staff, and students during their orientation, and follow up training for
those not new to the institution. An innovative best practice found to increase attitudes on
campus security is to assign roles or duties to administrators and senior faculty to increase their
responsibilities during a TVI. These people also receive executive level training seminars to
ensure they are ready to execute the campus security plan during an incident.
Research Question (e)
Research Question (e): Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI
security oversight, established across the board requirements for campus security plans and
exercises, and targeted resource support improve campus preparedness?
Triangulation of the data indicates new legislation that centralized IHE TVI security
oversight under one federal agency, aligned exercise requirements with HSEEP, and increased
resource support would improve campus security preparedness. While there was a general
consensus that new legislation would be beneficial in theory, in reality most feared it would
result in more unfunded mandates and add to the confusing morass of existing federal guidance.
Transferring oversight of campus security exercises and plans from the Department of Education
to FEMA or another agency was widely supported. In this framework, similar to what FEMA
does for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, IHEs would have the federal government exercise
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experts providing guidance, mentoring, and holding IHEs accountable, in conjunction with
existing Department of Education requirements linking student safety with federal loan support.
Discussion
Throughout this research, my goal was to discover barriers to and best practices for
improving security preparedness at IHEs. What I discovered was more than the dichotomy of
barriers and best practices. Through my data analysis, I identified four major themes:
hindrances, recommendations, best practices, and vested interest. Hindrances generally comprise
the “barriers,” while recommendations, best practices, and vested interest comprise the
“recognized excellence in campus preparedness” I conceived of when I began the study. Many
of the hindrances to campus security preparedness discovered from participant interviews relate
to lack of funding for and interest in security preparedness. Other hindrances include lack of
federal requirements for preparedness and the glut of confusing federal guidance.
Recommendations include having one federal guideline for security preparedness and moving
oversight of IHE security preparedness to another federal agency. Best practices include having
IHE senior leadership lead the way when it comes to preparedness and partnering with local
agencies on their security plans and exercises. Vested interest begins with the IHE senior
leadership who can instill these tenets throughout their institutions through example, practice,
and by making it pertinent to their populations.
Lack of funding or insufficient funding for IHE security preparedness was one of the
greatest and most consistent hindrances reported by the interviewees. Note that these institutions
both have robust planning and exercise programs. This finding is consistent with Schafer et al.
(2010) who found that only 31% of colleges and universities have increased funding for campus
safety since 2007. Funding deficits for campus IHE security preparedness have left significant
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gaps in campus safety. One of the major recommendations in the Report of the Review to the
President of the United States three months after the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 was “Where
we know what to do, we have to be better at doing it” (Leavitt et al., 2007, p. 16). Leaders
clearly know what to do to improve security preparedness on campuses, but without resource
commitment from IHEs, states, or the federal government, this is impractical.
Another significant hindrance found in the literature review indicated a general
disinterest in security preparedness among many IHEs. Seo et al. (2012) found that only 25% of
campuses believed their students understood or were prepared to respond to a crisis. Davis and
Walker (2005) discussed the lack of focus of faculty and students on campus security
preparedness, unless impacted by a past TVI or another event across the country. This sense of
apathy was echoed throughout the interviews at both institutions, with particular emphasis on
faculty and student disinterest in preparedness as noted by emergency managers and police
representatives at both institutions. The interview data also validated research by Frazzano and
Snyder (2014) regarding what can happen when instincts and a lack of training for security
preparedness are the culture of an IHE. According to Interviewee A8, who is a member of the
campus police, “We can’t even get them to evacuate the building without going through the front
exit all the time. We’re hoping the common sense may kick in, but there’s a general level of
apathy. With students, faculty, and staff, it’s not just related to students” (A8 Interview, May 16,
2016).
Data from interviews clearly showed a consensus from both case studies that the federal
guidance documents for security preparedness are confusing and duplicative, creating yet another
hindrance to preparedness. For instance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (2003),
“Building a Disaster-Resistant University” was one of the first post-Columbine and post 9/11
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pieces of federal guidance for IHE security preparedness. Following the disasters left in the
wakes of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the U.S. Department of Education (2007)
published the “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and
Communities.” Note that this was published in January of 2007, before the shootings at Virginia
Tech. However, not long after that horrific event, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(2008) published “Active shooter: How to Respond.” The U.S. Department of Education (2010)
published the “Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education.”
Within the U.S. Department of Education, the Office of Postsecondary Education (2011)
published the “Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting.” Two years later, another
office within the U.S. Department of Education, the Office of Elementary and Secondary
Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students (2013) published the “Guide for Developing
High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education.” The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (2013a) published “Fire/Emergency Medical Services
Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty
Incidents.” There is even an online course offered by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (2013b) entitled “IS-360 Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools,
Higher Education, and Houses of Worship.” In 2013, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (2013c) published what was most cited in the literature and among both institutions as
the critical tool to security preparedness, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP). Interviewees agreed that the numerous federal agency guidance documents
were exceedingly confusing and frustrating.
Interviewees widely recommended the creation of a definitive IHE federal agency
guidebook on campus security preparedness that consolidates information from the Department
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of Education, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Secret Service. However, the lack of federal requirements
for IHE security preparedness makes this a difficult task. Furthermore, and more alarmingly, it
makes IHEs more vulnerable to targeted violence on campus depending on voluntary
implementation of agency recommendations and their own vested interest in protecting their
populations.
While not explicitly discussed in the literature, a majority of interviewees favored
moving oversight of security preparedness out of the U.S. Department of Education and under
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or more specifically, FEMA. The consensus among
participants was that the DOE does not have the expertise to oversee security preparedness at
IHEs, but that FEMA does and should be the responsible agency. What was not consistent was
the push for new legislation requiring security preparedness at IHEs (i.e., to have a security plan
for TVIs, exercise the plan, implement lessons learned from exercises into the plan). While most
participants were in favor of more preparedness, many were fearful that new legislation would
entail more unfunded mandates.
Gaining campus security accreditation from the International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators is a relatively inexpensive, efficient, and effective method to
significantly enhance IHE security preparedness. According to the International Association of
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA; 2015), only a minority of IHEs have
applied for campus security accreditation. Neither of the institutions participating in this study
are accredited by IACLEA, however, one is accredited by the Commission on the Accreditation
of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) and the other is designated a “Disaster Resistant
University” by FEMA.
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Conducting exercises was noted as an extremely important element of campus security
preparedness by the interviewees and in the literature (Eaker & Viars, 2014; Frazzano & Snyder,
2014; Han et al., 2015; Jenkins & Goodman, 2015). However, no regulatory requirements exist
for IHEs to prepare or train for a TVI. Both institutions completed exercise after action reports
and updated their security plans based on lessons learned; however, items requiring funding for
improving the campus security plan and overall preparedness were difficult to implement based
on shifting priorities, lack of interest, and limited or no funding support.
All hazards planning is very important to developing an overall framework for
emergency preparedness activities (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Elementary and
Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013). This was reflected in
comments from interviewees regarding the importance of preparing for a TVI, but at the same
time, and perhaps more often, to prepare for other disasters on campus (e.g., fire/explosions at
research buildings, pandemic events, and natural disasters). Whether there is a TVI, tornado, or
fire, people need to be prepared to respond in order to increase survival. The tactics for an active
shooter, however, are somewhat different than a fire. Fire drills are mandated by law, so why are
active shooter drills not mandated? Although not required by law, both institutions included in
this study demonstrated superior best practices and vested interest with regards to all forms of
emergency preparedness. That is not to say that either institution has no room for improvement,
however, budgetary constraints is the primary limiting factor towards that end. Note that I
purposefully sampled these two institutions based on their high level of security preparedness.
Smaller IHEs with smaller budgets and fewer resources may not be as prepared as these two
institutions.
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Collaboration between IHEs and federal, state, and local agencies was consistently
stressed in the interview data as well as in the literature review as a best practice (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2003, 2013a; U.S. Department of Education, Office of
Elementary and Secondary Education, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013; U.S.
Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, 2011). Interviewees reported they
partnered with these agencies when possible, but without requirements for periodic meetings or
formal committees, as are established under the Maritime Transportation Security Act for the
maritime industry (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013), engagement activities are dependent on institutional
priorities.
The importance of IHE senior leadership engagement was noted in The U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (2015) report noting that college and university presidents and chancellors
are the single most important factor in campus resilience and emergency planning. However,
interviewees from both institutions reported varying levels of participation of senior leadership.
Vested interest falls with the leader of the institution and is the key to its success (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Interviewee A13 summed this up very well: “It’s
going to take a senior management commitment to say ‘this is what we’re about and to pay
attention to it’ so one, it has to be an edict from above” (A13 Interview, May 17, 2016).
Indicators of vested interest in campus preparedness should center on interest from senior
campus administrators and senior faculty who participate in exercises and ensure exercise lessons
learned are implemented in the campus security plan. Furthermore, having a robust exercise
program which is in alignment with the HSEEP recommended exercise cycles and plan updates
was a significant finding regarding improving invested attitudes and behaviors of faculty, staff,
and administrators on campus security preparedness. Additionally, training provided by
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engaging instructors who use everyday examples that people can connect with can increase
stakeholder investment in preparedness.
The selection of vested interest theory as the theoretical framework for this study has
proven to be extremely relevant in predicting behavior that will improve overall security at IHEs
(Miller et al., 2013). IHEs that have experienced TVIs first hand are intrinsically more vested in
security preparedness based on the impacts to the IHE and the significant recovery needed by
administrators, staff, faculty, and students.
This study bolsters much of the existing literature regarding negligible funding and
apathy regarding security preparedness, but it also contributes new information regarding
hindrances (i.e., barriers), best practices, and vested interests to improving security preparedness.
Furthermore, based on recommendations gleaned from the literature, my data collection, and my
own professional experience, I provide below many recommendations to enhance security
preparedness at IHEs.
Implications
The theoretical implications of this study validated that vested theory is an appropriate
research theory for IHE security preparedness. Major stakeholders that are impacted by this
study are federal agencies, IHEs (including all campus personnel), and local IHE partners. Using
the triangulation method of data analysis of site documentation, observations and interviews, I
have gleaned a multitude of insightful recommendations, best practices, and vested interests, as
well as identified significant hindrances. Below is a list of recommendations designed to
improve campus security preparedness.
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Recommendations Regarding Oversight, Guidance, and Funding
1. A Congressional review should be initiated to determine if moving oversight
responsibility to another federal entity, such as the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, would improve student safety.
2. The Department of Education or Congress should consider proposing legislation, similar
to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, mandating IHE Security
Committees, establishing exercise requirements with oversight from FEMA, and adding
an IHE security specialist at each institution in the country, either private or public,
regardless of the size. The chair of the IHE Security Committee would be either the
president or chancellor of the IHE. This recommendation is in alignment with the
HSAAC report, which noted the single most important element in campus security is the
president or chancellor (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015). Presidents and
chancellors would be required to submit an annual report on campus security

preparedness to FEMA, which would review, and submit a report to Congress annually.
3. The Department of Education should recommend legislation to establish an IHE Security
Grant Program, similar to the Port Security Grant Program under the MTSA, that
provides funding based on risk to IHEs for security preparedness improvements and
annual training.
4. The U.S. Department of Education or other agency should establish one overall IHE
security guidebook. FEMA would be the best fit for a federal agency to accomplish this
task given its work with Disaster Resistant University Program and HSEEP oversight.
The creation of a consolidated campus security guidebook would be extremely beneficial
to campus security preparedness.
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Recommendations for IHEs
1. IHEs should apply for accreditation of its campus security program through IACLEA or
CALEA. Accreditation of the campus security program provides third party oversight by
security planning professionals and greater credibility for student safety. The IACLEA
accreditation utilizes 210 standards in collaboration with numerous state law enforcement
accreditation agencies.
2. IHEs should have a dedicated campus security preparedness specialist that focuses on
security plan development, outreach with campus stakeholders, and local emergency
responders. The campus security specialist should implement the various phases of
exercise develop according to HSEEP guidelines.
3. IHEs should follow HSEEP guidance, which includes developing a five year campus
security exercise plan that maximizes participation from administrators, staff, faculty, and
students.
4. IHEs should follow the ICS protocols that link with local, state, and federal first
responders. The president or chancellor should receive Incident Commander training and
participate in campus security exercises.
5. IHEs should require all campus personnel (administrators, faculty, staff, and students) to
register for an emergency notification system. All who register must provide a phone
number.
6. IHEs should establish a safety committee, with membership from administration, staff,
faculty, and students to review after action reports, determine priorities based on risk, and
make recommendations for funding to senior leadership.
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7. IHEs should partner with local community stakeholders such as police, fire, EMS,
hospitals, etc. to use all available resources for the campus security plan.
8. IHEs should not rely on a single marketing source to advertise training. Publish
information about trainings in campus newspapers (online or print), but also have senior
leadership (e.g., president, chancellor, provost, deans, department chairs, etc.) send mass
email to their respective populations advertising training and emphasizing importance of
training. Research demonstrates modeling the way from senior leadership improves
investment in security preparedness.
9. IHEs should invest in smart classroom emergency notification systems so that the proper
authorities can be notified immediately in the event of an emergency in the classroom.
10. Emergency managers at IHEs should consider joining the University and College Caucus
of International Association of Emergency Managers to stay abreast in their area of
expertise.
11. IHEs should register with the list serve for Oregon Disaster Resistant University
https://lists.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/dru. Oregon University has taken the lead as a
Disaster Resistant University to share information among other institutions with the same
certification on campus emergency management and business continuity.
Recommendations Regarding Training
1. Training should be conducted by experts in the field. For instance, the national training
program, Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), is an
excellent resource to train law enforcement and emergency management professionals in
security preparedness as well as provides certification so that these individuals can train
the general campus population.
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2. IHE senior leadership (e.g., chancellors, provosts, presidents, vice presidents, deans, and
assistant deans) should complete FEMA’s online course, IS-360 Preparing for TVI
incidents: A guide for schools, higher education, and houses of worship.
3. All new campus personnel (administrators, faculty, staff, and students) should be required
to complete campus preparedness security training. Employment and/or enrollment
should be contingent upon completion of this training.
4. Established campus personnel should be required to complete a brief refresher course
(online or in person) annually. Salaries and/or release of grades could be used as a tool
for gaining compliance.
5. Campus personnel participating in a training should be instructed on the security plan
updates before an exercise to maximize the learning potential.
6. Training should be multifaceted, targeted to each audience, effective, and efficient. The
participants will remember it and be less resentful at having been required to do
something
7. Trainings should be offered at multiple times, dates, and locations to accommodate a
multitude of busy schedules.
8. Do not overdo training! Too much will be exhausting for everyone involved and lead to
over saturation, boredom, and further apathy.
9. Inquire whether campus law enforcement officials are eligible to apply for funding for
active shooter training under the new POLICE Act of 2016.
Limitations
Several limitations were identified in this research study. First, I encountered difficulty
accessing targeted interviewees during the scheduled data collection period at the end of the
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spring term and beginning of the summer term. Several interviewee targets’ schedules were too
full to allow for an interview and others were not available via email as they were not teaching
during the summer term. Additionally, I was unable to collect observation data for Alpha
Institution, as no exercise was scheduled during my data collection phase. Lack of this
observation data may have impacted a thorough triangulation of the data.
Purposeful sampling identified institutions from the literature review meeting metrics of
IHEs with very proactive campus security programs. Consequently, institutions with very little
focus on campus security preparedness were not represented in the study. An examination of
such an institution could identify additional hindrances, recommendations, best practices, vested
interests, or something entirely new. Community colleges were not included as part of the
research study which could also have unique campus security issues and perspectives.
Recommendations for Future Research
Additional qualitative case studies are recommended to further contribute to the body of
knowledge regarding security at IHEs. The following is a list of topics recommended for future
research:
1. Case studies using the same framework of this study, but that include community
colleges and IHEs in different locales (e.g., West Coast, Midwest).
2. Case studies using the same framework of this study, but at IHEs with a lesser emphasis
on security than what was found with Alpha and Bravo Institutions
3. Examine the relationship or effect of a robust and proactive mental health and/or
counseling program and the incidence of TVIs on campus?
4. Would more guns on campus deter TVIs? Should anyone with a gun permit, other than
law enforcement, be allowed to carry a gun on campus?
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5. What has Virginia Tech, or other IHE that has suffered a mass active shooter event, done
to recover and improve security preparedness on campus?
6. A legal analysis of the U.S. Department of Education’s authority to hold IHEs
accountable for minimum 34 CFR 688.46 requirements would also contribute to the
research. Analyze what fines were issued to Virginia Tech and why. Why were the fines
overturned? Is the U.S. Department of Education’s authority to penalize a non-compliant
IHE too weak, or were other forces at play?
7. Would FEMA’s Training and Education Division be the best fit as a center for IHE TVI
preparedness? Or would it be better for oversight to rest at FEMA’s Regional Offices?
Summary
A thorough review of the literature revealed inconsistent and often inadequate security
preparedness for TVIs at IHEs. This is not surprising given the lack of federal or state
requirements to do so. The aim of this study was to identify barriers to and best practices for
improving security preparedness for TVIs at IHEs. Data collection consisted of site
documentation review, observation of an exercise, and interviews with campus personnel. I
identified four themes from the data with regard to campus security preparedness: hindrances,
recommendations, best practices, and vested interests. The major barriers to improving security
preparedness were lack of resource funding for dedicated preparedness staff, security planning
and exercises; apathy regarding campus security preparedness by administrators, staff, faculty,
and students; multiple federal security preparedness guides with no clear directive of which one
should be used; and the lack of federal or state requirements for robust security planning and
exercises. Major recommendations identified from the data include increased funding for
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security preparedness training, planning, and exercises; IHE senior leadership must model the
way; and the transfer of IHE campus security preparedness oversight from DOE to FEMA.
The big question is would you want your loved ones to attend or work at an IHE with a
weak security preparedness program? TVIs are no longer rare and shocking. During this
research study, the number and severity of active shooter events in numerous locations in the
U.S. and worldwide became so overwhelming I stopped looking into each one. That was until
September 28, 2016, when a 14-year-old child gunned down a teacher and three young children
playing outside at recess at an elementary school near my hometown in South Carolina. The
school had conducted an active shooter drill not two days before the incident. If not for that
security training and the heroism of a nearby volunteer fire fighter who tackled the shooter, the
number of injured or dead would likely be much higher. It is no longer a matter of if, but when
you or a loved one may be faced with such a scenario. Thinking it cannot happen to you or
hoping things work out are not strategies for success. It is not sufficient to say security
preparedness is important. Building vested interest and committed attitudes is a top down
approach. Leadership must take proactive steps and make stakeholders engaged and
accountable, with or without federal mandates. We owe our students, faculty, and staff the due
diligence to ensure IHEs can respond successfully to TVIs.
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APPENDIX A: Dissertation Timeline
Submit chapters 1-3 to the research consultant
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 3(allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit to chair

01Nov15

Provide Chair with Most Recent Manuscript (Chapters 1-3)
Edit, make suggestions, return (allow 2 weeks)

01Dec15

Submit chapters 1-3 to committee
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 3(allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit
Approve to send to research consultant or recycle above process

18Dec15

EDUC 989 Proposal, Spring Term (Semester 1)
Approve for proposal defense or make additional edits

10Jan16

Submit materials to committee for proposal defense (15 minute Power
Point presentation via GoTo Meeting application), with the following
slides: Introduction, Abstract, Literature Review, Data Collection, etc.

10Jan16

Proposal defense

14Jan16

Submit IRB application
Wait for IRB approval/ suggested revisions (allow at least 1 month)

15Jan16
15Feb16

Execute research/ Collect Data at Bravo School

15Feb-15Apr16

Execute research/Collect Data at Alpha School

15Mar-01Jun16

EDUC 989 Data Collection, Summer Term (Semester 2)
Data Analysis

01 June - 01 Aug 16

Submit chapter 4
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapter 4(allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit
Approve to send to committee or recycle above process

01Sep16

Submit chapter 5
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapter 5 (allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit
Approve to send to committee or recycle above process

15Aug16
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EDUC 990 Defense, Fall Term
Submit chapters 1-5 to committee
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 5(allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit
Approve to send to research consultant or recycle above process

01Sep16

Submit chapters 1-5 to the research consultant
Edit, make suggestions, return Chapters 1- 5 (allow 2 weeks)
Make revisions and resubmit to chair
Approve for editing or make additional edits

10Sep16

Send to Editor (allow at least 1 month)
Make all edits suggested by the editor and resubmit to chair

17Sep16

Approve for defense or make additional edits
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Submit materials to committee and other LU staff needed for defense
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Dissertation Defense
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APPENDIX B: Open Ended Interview Questions
Dean or Assistant Dean of Student Affairs Questions
1. Does your institution have a regular program for conducting campus preparedness
exercises in accordance with the federal agency guidance (links to research question (a))?
2. What is your role on campus regarding an active shooter incident and the institution
security plan (links to research question (b))?
3. Have you ever participated in an active shooter exercise or training (links to research
question (b))?
4. What are best practices you have observed from campus active shooter training or
exercises (links to research question (c))?
5. What do you recommend to motivate students, staff, or faculty to be more invested in
active shooter preparedness (links to research question (c))?
6. Do you have any recommended best practices for campus security preparedness (links
to research question (c))?
7. How can the attitudes and behaviors of administrators consistently be focused on
investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness (links to research question (d))?
8. Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight
improve campus security plans and exercises (links to research question (e))?
9. Is there anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness (links to
research questions (a-e))?
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Campus Emergency Managers and Senior Police Representative Questions
1. How does your institution conduct faculty and administrative staff training on the
security plan (links to research question (a))?
2. How does your institution involve multiple partners (local emergency management,
local responders) in the security planning process (links to research question (a))?
3. Does your institution have a regular program for conducting campus preparedness
exercises (links to research question (a))?
4. How does your institution measure the effectiveness of security plan exercises (links to
research question (b))?
5. How does your institution incorporate after action report lessons learned into updates to
the campus security plan (links to research question (a))?
6. How is ICS incorporated in the security planning process and what are any best
practices (links to research questions (a-c))?
7. What would you recommend to motivate administrators to be more interested in
security preparedness (links to research question (d))?
8. How can the attitudes and behaviors of students, faculty, staff, and administrators
consistently be focused on investing in active shooter overall campus preparedness (links
to research question (d))?
9. Would new legislation that centralized federal agency IHE TVI security oversight
improve resource support improve campus preparedness (links to research question (e))?
10. Is there anything else you would like to add regarding active student preparedness
(links to research questions (a-e))?
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APPENDIX C: Interview Protocol

Interview Protocol Project: Campus Security Preparedness
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer:
Interviewee:
Position of the Interviewee:

Questions: (See Appendix B for questions per type of interview)
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APPENDIX D: Observation Record

Exercise or Security Planning Meeting Observation Record
________________________________________________________________________

Name: ______________________________________________
Date and Time: _______________________________________
Subject being Observed: ________________________________
Observations of events and behaviors:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Comments/Summary:
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APPENDIX E: Liberty University IRB Permission Template

[This permission request template is provided for your convenience. Recommended information is
included in italicized brackets. Please select the desired information, remove the italics and brackets, and
remove the information that does not apply to your research. It may also be necessary to highlight the
entire document when you have finished making your changes and select a font so that the font will be
uniform throughout.]
Date: [Insert Date]
[Recipient]
[Title]
[Company]
[Address 1]
[Address 2]
[Address 3]

Dear [Recipient]:

As a graduate student in the [department] at Liberty University, I am conducting
research as part of the requirements for a[n] [degree]. The title of my research project is [title]
and the purpose of my research is [purpose].
I am writing to request your permission to [conduct my research in/at [school
district/school name, church name, business name, organization name, etc.][utilize your
membership list to recruit participants for my research][contact members of your
staff/church/organization to invite them to participate in my research study][access and utilize
student/staff test data/records]. [Select the appropriate phrase.]
[Select the appropriate sentence.] Participants will be asked to [go to [webpage] and
click on the link provided/complete the attached survey/contact me to schedule an
interview/etc.]. [or] The data will be used to [include explanation here]. Participants will be
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presented with informed consent information prior to participating. Taking part in this study is
completely voluntary, and participants are welcome to discontinue participation at any time.
Thank you for considering my request. If you choose to grant permission, [please
provide a signed statement on approved letterhead indicating your approval][or][respond by
email to [researcher’s email address]. [Select the appropriate clause. For education research,
school/district permission will need to be on approved letterhead with the appropriate
signature(s)].
Sincerely,

[Your Name]
[Your Title]
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